On singular control games : with applications to capital accumulation by Steg, Jan-Henrik
On Singular Control Games -
With
Applications to Capital Accumulation
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors
der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) an der Fakulta¨t
fu¨r Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universita¨t Bielefeld
vorgelegt von
Diplom-Wirtschaftsingenieur Jan-Henrik Steg
Bielefeld, April 2010
Erstgutachter
Professor Dr. Frank Riedel
Institut fu¨r Mathematische
Wirtschaftsforschung (IMW)
Universita¨t Bielefeld
Zweitgutachter
Professor Dr. Herbert Dawid
Institut fu¨r Mathematische
Wirtschaftsforschung (IMW)
Universita¨t Bielefeld
Gedruckt auf alterungsbesta¨ndigem Papier nach DIN-ISO 9706
Contents
1 Introduction 4
1.1 Capital accumulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Irreversible investment and singular control . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Strategic option exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Grenadier’s model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2 Open loop strategies 14
2.1 Perfect competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.1 Characterization of equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.2 Construction of equilibrium investment . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.3 Myopic optimal stopping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 The game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Symmetric equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Monotone follower problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.1 First order condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.2 Base capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5 Asymmetric equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6 Explicit solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 Closed loop strategies 43
3.1 The game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Open loop equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Markov perfect equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 A verification theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4.1 Reflection strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.2 Verification theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 Bertrand equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Myopic investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6.1 The myopic investor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6.2 Playing against a myopic investor . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.6.3 Equilibrium failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2
3.7 Collusive equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Appendix 84
Lemma 3.11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Proof of Lemma 3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Proof of Theorem 2.15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Bibliography 88
3
Chapter 1
Introduction
The aim of this work is to establish a mathematically precise framework for
studying games of capital accumulation under uncertainty. Such games arise
as a natural extension from different perspectives that all lead to singular
control exercised by the agents, which induces some essential formalization
problems.
Capital accumulation as a game in continuous time originates from the
work of Spence [33], where firms make dynamic investment decisions to ex-
pand their production capacities irreversibly. Spence analyses the strategic
effect of capital commitment, but in a deterministic world. We add uncer-
tainty to the model — as he suggests — to account for an important further
aspect of investment. Uncertain returns induce a reluctance to invest and
thus allow to abolish the artificial bound on investment rates, resulting in
singular control.
In a rather general formulation, this intention has only been achieved be-
fore for the limiting case of perfect competition, where an individual firm’s
action does not influence other players’ payoffs and decisions, see [6]. The
perfectly competitive equilibrium is linked via a social planner to the other
extreme, monopoly, which benefits similarly from the lack of interaction.
There is considerable work on the single agent’s problem of sequential irre-
versible investment, see e.g. [12, 30, 31], and all instances involve singular
control. In our game, the number of players is finite and actions have a
strategic effect, so this is the second line of research we extend.
With irreversible investment, the firm’s opportunity to freely choose the
time of investment is a perpetual real option. It is intuitive that the value of
the option is strongly affected when competitors can influence the value of
the underlying by their actions. The classical option value of waiting [15, 29]
is threatened under competition and the need arises to model option exercise
games.
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While typical formulations [23, 28] assume fixed investment sizes and pose
only the question how to schedule a single action, we determine investment
sizes endogenously. Our framework is also the limiting case for repeated
investment opportunities of arbitrarily small size. Since investment is allowed
to take the form of singular control, its rate need not be defined even where
it occurs continuously.
An early instance of such a game is the model by Grenadier [22]. It
received much attention because it connects the mentioned different lines
of research, but it became also clear that one has to be very careful with
the formulation of strategies. As Back and Paulsen [4] show, it is exactly
the singular nature of investment which poses the difficulties. They explain
that Grenadier’s results hold only for open loop strategies, which are invest-
ment plans merely contingent on exogenous shocks. Even to specify sensible
feedback strategies poses severe conceptual problems.
We also begin with open loop strategies, which condition investment only
on the information concerning exogenous uncertainty. Technically, this is
the multi-agent version of the sequential irreversible investment problem,
since determining a best reply to open loop strategies in a rather general
formulation is a monotone follower problem. The main new mathematical
problem is then consistency in equilibrium. We show that it suffices to focus
on the instantaneous strategic properties of capital to obtain quite concise
statements about equilibrium existence and characteristics, without a need
to specify the model or the underlying uncertainty in detail. Nevertheless,
the scope for strategic interaction is rather limited when modelling open loop
strategies.
With our subsequent account of closed loop strategies, we enter com-
pletely new terrain. While formulating the game with open loop strategies is
a quite clear extension of monopoly, we now have to propose classes of strate-
gies that can be handled, and conceive of an appropriate (subgame perfect)
equilibrium definition. To achieve this, we can borrow only very little from
the differential games literature.
After establishing the formal framework in a first effort, we encounter
new control problems in equilibrium determination. Since the methods used
for open loop strategies are not applicable, we take a dynamic programming
approach and develop a suitable verification theorem. It is applied to con-
struct different classes of Markov perfect equilibria for the Grenadier model
[22] to study the effect of preemption on the value of the option to delay
investment. In fact, there are Markov perfect equilibria with positive option
values despite perfect circumstances for preemption.
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1.1 Capital accumulation
Capital accumulation games have become classical instances of differential
games since the work by Spence [33]. In these games1, firms typically compete
on some output good market in continuous time and obtain instantaneous
equilibrium profits depending on the firms’ current capital stocks, which act
as strategic substitutes. The firms can control their investment rates at any
time to adjust their capital stocks.
By irreversibility, undertaken investment has commitment power and we
can observe the effect of preemption. However, as Spence elaborated, this
depends on the type of strategies that firms are presumed to use. The issue
is discussed in the now common terminology by Fudenberg and Tirole [21],
who take up his model.
If firms commit themselves at the beginning of the game to investment
paths such that the rates are functions of time only, one speaks of open loop
strategies. In this case, the originally dynamic game becomes in fact static
in the sense that there is a single instance of decision making and there are
no reactions during the implementation of the chosen investment plans. In
equilibrium, the firms build up capital levels that are — as a steady state —
mutual best replies.
However, if one firm can reach its open loop equilibrium capital level
earlier than the opponent, it may be advantageous to keep investing further
ahead. Then, the lagging firm has to adapt to the larger firm’s capital stock
and its best reply may be to stop before reaching the open loop equilibrium
target, resulting in an improvement for the quicker firm. The laggard cannot
credibly threaten to expand more than the best reply to the larger opponent’s
capital level in order to induce the latter to invest less in the first place. So,
we observe preemption with asymmetric payoffs.
Commitments like to an open loop investment profile should only be
allowed if they are a clear choice in the model setup. Whenever a revision of
the investment policy is deemed possible, an optimal continuation of the game
from that point on should be required in equilibrium. Strategies involving
commitment in general do not form such subgame perfect equilibria. To
model dynamic decision making, at least state-dependent strategies have to
be considered, termed closed loop or feedback strategies2.
In capital accumulation games, the natural (minimal) state to condition
instantaneous investment decisions on are the current capital levels. They
comprise all influence of past actions on current and future payoffs. Closed
1See also [16].
2This terminology is adapted from control theory.
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loop strategies of this type are called Markovian strategies, and with a prop-
erly defined state, subgame perfect equilibria in these strategies persist also
with richer strategy spaces.
In order to observe any dynamic interaction and preemption in the deter-
ministic model, one has to impose an upper bound on the investment rates.
Since the optimal Markovian strategies are typically “bang-bang” (i.e., when-
ever there is an incentive to invest, it should occur at the maximally feasible
rate), an unlimited rate would result in immediate jumps, terminating all
dynamics in the model. The ability to expand faster is a strategic advan-
tage by the commitment effect and no new investment incentives arise in the
game.
Introducing uncertainty adds a fundamental aspect to investment, foster-
ing endogenous reluctance and more dynamic decisions. With stochastically
evolving returns, it is generally not optimal to invest up to capital levels
that imply a mutual lock-in for the rest of time. Although investment may
occur infinitely fast, the firms prefer a stepwise expansion under uncertainty,
because the option to wait is valuable with irreversible investment.
1.2 Irreversible investment and
singular control
The value of the option to wait is an important factor in the problem of
sequential irreversible investment under uncertainty (e.g. [1, 30]). When the
firm can arbitrarily divide investments, it owns de facto a family of real
options on installing marginal capital units. The exercise of these options
depends on the gradual revelation of information regarding the uncertain re-
turns, analogously to single real options. It is valuable to reduce the probabil-
ity of low returns by investing only when the net present value is sufficiently
positive.
The relation between implementing a monotone capital process with un-
restricted investment rate but conditional on dynamic information about
exogenous uncertainty and timing the exercise of growth options based on
the same information is in mathematical terms that between singular control
and optimal stopping.
For all degrees of competition discussed in the literature — monopoly,
perfect competition [27], and oligopoly [5, 22] — optimal investment takes
the form of singular control. This means that investment occurs only at
singular events, though usually not in lumps but nevertheless at undefined
rates.
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Typically only initial investment is a lump. In most models, subsequent
investment is triggered by the output good price reaching a critical thresh-
old and the additional output dynamically prevents the price from exceeding
this boundary. This happens in a minimal way so that the control paths
needed for the “reflection” are continuous. While the location of the re-
flection boundary incorporates positive option premia for the monopolist,
it coincides with the zero net present value threshold in the case of perfect
competition, which eliminates any positive (expected) profits derived from
delaying investment. The results for oligopoly depend on the strategy types,
see Section 1.4 below.
The relation between singular control and optimal stopping holds at a
quite abstract level, which permits to study irreversible investment more
generally than for continuous Markov processes and also in absence of ex-
plicit solutions, see [31] for monopoly and [6] regarding perfect competition.
Such a general approach in fact turns out particularly beneficial for studying
oligopoly.
Here, the presence of opponent capital processes increases the complexity
of the optimization problems and consistency in equilibrium is another issue.
Consequently, one has to be very careful to transfer popular option valuation
methods or otherwise acknowledged principles on the one hand, while the
chance to obtain closed form solutions shrinks correspondingly on the other
hand.
The singular control problems of the monopolist and of the social planner
introduced for equilibrium determination under perfect competition are of
the monotone follower type. For these control problems there exists a quite
general theory built on their connection to optimal stopping, see [7, 19].
This theory facilitates part of our study of oligopoly, too. It is a quite
straightforward extension of the polar cases to formalize a general game
of irreversible investment with a finite number of players using open loop
strategies. In this case, the individual optimization problems are of the
monotone follower type as well. The main new problem becomes to ensure
consistency in equilibrium.
A crucial facet for us is the characterization of optimal controls by a first
order condition in terms of discounted marginal revenue, used by Bertola
[12] and introduced to the general theory of singular control by Bank and
Riedel [10, 7]. Note that given some investment plan, it is feasible to schedule
additional investments at stopping times. With an optimal plan, the addi-
tional expected profit from marginal investment at any stopping time cannot
be positive. Contrarily, at any stopping time such that capital increases by
optimal investment, marginal profit cannot be negative since reducing the
corresponding investment is feasible.
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Based on this intuitive characterization, which is actually sufficient for
optimal investment, we show that equilibrium determination can be reduced
to solving a single monotone follower problem. However, the final step re-
quires some work on the utilized methods, to which we dedicate a separate
discourse.
The actual equilibrium capital processes are derived in terms of a signal
process by tracking the running supremum of the latter. Riedel and Su
call the signal “base capacity”[31], because it is the minimal capital level
that a firm would ever want. Using the base capacity as investment signal
corresponds to the mentioned price threshold to trigger investment insofar as
adding capacity is always profitable for current levels below the base capacity
(resp. when the current output price exceeds the trigger price), but never
when the capital stock exceeds the base capacity (resp. when the output
price is below the threshold). Tracking the — unique — base capacity is the
optimal policy for any starting state or time, similar to a stationary trigger
price for a Markovian price process.
Under certain conditions, the signal process can be obtained as the solu-
tion to a particular backward equation, where existence is guaranteed by a
corresponding stochastic representation theorem (for a detailed presentation,
see [8], for further applications [7, 9]).
When the necessary condition for this method is violated, which is typical
for oligopoly, one can still resort to the related optimal control approach via
stopping time problems. Here, the optimal times to install each marginal
capital unit are determined independently, like exercising a real option. The
right criterion therefor is the opportunity cost of waiting.
These optimal stopping (resp. option exercise) problems form a family
which allows a unified treatment by monotonicity and continuity. Indeed, at
each point in time, there exists a maximal capital level for which the option
to delay (marginal) investment is worthless. This is exactly the base capacity
described above and the same corresponding investment rule is optimal.
As a consequence, irreversible investment is optimal not when the net
present value of the additional investment is greater or equal zero, but when
the opportunity cost of delaying the investment is greater or equal zero.
1.3 Strategic option exercise
The incentives of delaying investment due to dynamic uncertainty on the one
hand and of strategic preemption on the other hand contradict each other.
Therefore, when the considered real option is not exclusive, it is necessary to
study games of option exercise. The usual setting in the existing literature
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is a two-player game, where each player possesses a single real option, e.g. to
enter or exit some market or to increase capacity by an investment of fixed
size. One then tries to determine an equilibrium in exercise times.
Depending on the relative strengths of the involved incentives, generally
two types of Markov perfect equilibria arise. For instance Mason and Weeds
[28] formulate a “reduced form” model to study the influence of varying
degrees of uncertainty on the strategic effects that appear in option exercise
games. Two firms can decide in continuous time when to make an irreversible
investment, which starts a payoff stream that is affected by an exogenous
stochastic shock process. The latter is an observable geometric Brownian
motion, so a Markovian strategy takes the simple form of a trigger value for
the shock process.
Of course, the payoff streams depend also on the exercise decisions of both
firms, for which two effects are important. First, if there is a considerable
advantage to being the leader — for instance due to subsequent entry deter-
rence allowing temporary monopoly profits — one speaks of the incentive to
preempt the opponent. The (ubiquitous) equilibrium driven by preemption
is sequential exercise. Second, the externalities from simultaneous exercise
may under circumstances be sufficiently favourable to allow for such a second
class of equilibria.
These two types of equilibria have also been obtained by Fudenberg and
Tirole in their study of a deterministic timing game [20], to which the typical
option exercise games are analogies. Markov perfect equilibria with sequen-
tial exercise are determined in the latter according to the same principle.
By backward induction, the second mover exercises optimally “in isolation”,
conditional on the first mover having exercised before. Then, since the firms
need to be indifferent regarding their roles in equilibrium, the leader has to
exercise such that the expected payoff equals that of the follower, i.e. earlier
than in isolation. We necessarily observe rent equalization in the respectively
unique sequential equilibrium.
Simultaneous exercise is usually conceived to be inferior to sequential
exercise and corresponds to a coordination error. However, the particular
model may also allow a second class of Markov perfect equilibria with si-
multaneous exercise, which then even forms a continuum with Pareto ranked
elements. Under uncertainty, the real option benefits are qualitatively unmit-
igated in these shared equilibria, as Mason and Weeds’ comparative statics
demonstrate. This result contrasts the observation that the leader’s exercise
trigger increases much less with uncertainty in sequential equilibrium than in
isolation and is even bounded. Preemption strongly limits the option value
of waiting.
The sequential equilibria with Markovian strategies as proposed by Ma-
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son and Weeds are arguably unsatisfactory because ex ante identical firms are
supposed to coordinate on the roles of leader and follower. While the payoffs
are unaffected due to rent equalization, the conceptual problem is rather how
to exclude the possibility of coordination failure or that one would prefer the
outcome to result from symmetric strategies. This issue is addressed by the
authors Huisman, Kort, Pawlina and Thijssen in a number of works, sum-
marized in [24]. Again, they build on the deterministic case [20]. Fudenberg
and Tirole provide a concept to treat coordination problems endogenously
by extending the strategy spaces. If the players regret having stopped si-
multaneously, they play a repeated auxiliary game (which costs no time) to
determine the winner. The stage probabilities of playing “invest” in this
auxiliary game are part of the extended strategies in the timing game.
Huisman et al. transfer this concept to formulate mixed (symmetric)
strategies for the stochastic option exercise game. Then, when the initial
state of the game does not induce immediate exercise, one observes the com-
mon preemption outcome where the leader is endogenously determined with
equal probabilities. Otherwise the repeated game decides who invests imme-
diately. When the model admits the Pareto improving simultaneous exercise
equilibria, they also exist with those extended strategies that represent the
corresponding pure strategies.
The simultaneous equilibria in [24] arise in the case of capacity expansion
by two already active firms. In this dynamic situation, it is quite a limitation
to dictate the investment sizes and to endow each firm with a single action
only. Boyer et al. aim to analyse the effect of repeated investment opportu-
nities [13, 14]. However, in order to be able to conduct backward induction,
it is necessary to assume a finite market size, resp. that capacity increments
are always large relative to the market, which induces an (endogenous) end
of the game by enforcing situations such that no further investment ever
becomes profitable. Since the authors also adapt the concept of Fudenberg
and Tirole (though in a different way than Huisman et al.) to define mixed
strategies, tractability limits the analysis to few steps.
1.4 Grenadier’s model
Grenadier has formulated a model with investment opportunities coming
closer to capital accumulation. In [22], he proposes a game between a fi-
nite number of firms that can increase their output of a homogeneous good
at any time by arbitrarily divisible investment, where inverse demand is af-
fected by an exogenous diffusion process. Since the firms are identical, he
aims at a symmetric equilibrium (in strategies and outcome) from the out-
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set. Furthermore, the model is designed such that investment takes the form
of “infinitesimal increments” when the shock process reaches certain thresh-
olds, intending continuous output paths. This means the singular controls
described above. A crucial ingredient therefor is the purely proportional
investment cost and that marginal revenue is increasing in the exogenous
shock. The only further structural assumption made is that marginal rev-
enue decreases in the individual firm’s own output.
Unfortunately, Grenadier does not provide a strictly formal definition of
the strategies that players may use. On the one hand, he states quite clearly
that each firm i chooses an output process qi(t) and recognizes that opponent
outputQ−i(t) is beyond its control, but taken account of. Consequently, firms
use open loop strategies as defined above. On the other hand, Grenadier
defines the state of the game comprising the current shock value X(t) and
the output quantities and sets out to determine investment trigger functions
X i(qi, Q−i) for each firm i with current output qi and facing opponent output
Q−i, in order to generate the output paths. This approach strongly resembles
Markovian strategies.
Grenadier also provides conditions for optimal behaviour in terms of the
trigger functions. For concreteness, he heuristically derives a set of value
matching and smooth pasting conditions at the level of Dumas [17] to identify
the value function and best reply trigger for an individual player. He then
applies the argument of Leahy [27] to claim that the myopic triggers are
optimal, which are the optimal triggers for marginal investment if the current
output levels are fixed forever. While the steps up to this point involve
general individual output processes, Grenadier now resorts to the symmetric
expansion path to observe that one ends up with a standard problem with a
single control variable, aggregate output.
Equilibrium aggregate output Q∗ is then determined by the “standard”
real option methods, again with the help of a trigger function X∗(Q). The
actual symmetric equilibrium output processes are simply 1
n
Q∗(t). One can
indeed define proper open loop output processes in this way, which Grenadier
should have emphasized more clearly.
His model and results obtain considerable attention and works building
upon the formulation and methodology emerge, see for instance [2]. How-
ever, it is also recognized that further clarification is necessary, to prevent
misunderstanding regarding the employed strategies and implied potential
subgame perfection, as well as to address the interdependent new optimiza-
tion problems rigorously.
These issues are the focus of Back and Paulsen [4]. They start with a
formal definition of open loop strategies as the same controls available to the
monopolist in the sequential irreversible investment problem. Then a set of
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optimality conditions similar to Grenadier’s is given to verify a symmetric
equilibrium, but accompanied by a formal sufficiency proof (also involving
myopic triggers). Consequently, the symmetric equilibrium of Grenadier does
exist in open loop strategies. However, it does not exist if one interprets the
trigger functions as Markovian strategies, for which the authors construct a
counterexample with profitable preemption. Consequently, the equilibrium
is not subgame perfect.
Back and Paulsen also discuss the conceptual problems in even defining
the game with closed loop strategies and conclude they do not know how to
do so. If one wants to preserve singular control, the undertaken investments
are no proper actions to be assigned by strategies, because investment is nei-
ther discrete nor does it occur at well defined (bounded) rates. Consequently,
strategies have to relate to the absolute levels of capital. In principle, this
can be managed also with the restrictions of monotonicity and of condition-
ing on current information in a mathematically feasible way, for instance
precisely by trigger functions. However, the additional problem prevailing
in any continuous-time game that plausible strategies do not uniquely define
the course of the game can hardly be excluded.
We propose a formal framework for singular control games with feedback
strategies in Chapter 3 and prove that there exist further Markov perfect
equilibria in Grenadier’s model besides the one argued by Back and Paulsen,
who suggest that firms invest in perfect competition quantities under com-
plete dissipation of option values.
13
Chapter 2
Open loop strategies
In this chapter we study a game of capital accumulation under uncertainty,
which is the multi-agent version of the sequential irreversible investment
problem. Like the monopolist planning to expand capacity by arbitrar-
ily divisible investment, the players choose adapted, nondecreasing, left-
continuous stochastic processes for the expansion of their capital stocks. Such
are open loop strategies.
Back and Paulsen [4] clarify that the symmetric equilibrium proposed by
Grenadier for his model [22] only exists with open loop strategies, so it is an
instance of the game we formulate. However, their rigorous proof provides
only a set of sufficient conditions for very similar frameworks and general
existence is not clear. Our aim is to propose an unambiguous framework, in
which no investment trigger functions are involved (which could cause misun-
derstanding) and with a quite abstract notion of the underlying uncertainty.
We fully concentrate on the strategic properties of capital to study com-
mitment power and characterize existence and nature of equilibria in the
general game formulation. Allowing for non-Markovian shock processes (pos-
sibly with jumps) and heterogeneous initial capital stocks, we show that one
can determine existence of and behaviour in equilibrium by focusing on the
strategic properties of instantaneous profit.
The employed assumptions strongly resemble common ones from the clas-
sical Cournot literature. With them, we can reduce the determination of any
equilibrium to solving a single agent problem, which is of the same structure
as any firm’s best reply problem. When all players use open loop strategies,
these are classical monotone follower problems. While we can make use of
the related literature, we tailor the methods to our needs, where consistency
in equilibrium is the main new issue. A very helpful concept for us will be
the characterization of optimal controls by a first order condition as already
employed by Bertola [12] and developed more generally by Bank [7].
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We introduce this central first order condition and illustrate its role for
equilibrium by the simpler case of perfect competition, where we can repro-
duce the results of Baldursson and Karatzas [6] more directly. Then, we
move to oligopoly and transfer the singular control approach developed by
Bank and Riedel [10] to determining a symmetric equilibrium. In this case
it is possible to construct the equilibrium capital processes by applying a
stochastic representation theorem.
To be able to handle the case of asymmetric initial capital, we need
to elaborate on the methods from the general theory of monotone follower
problems. With this preparation, we will obtain very concise results and
give a full characterisation of open loop equilibria as solutions of a single
monotone follower problem.
After these general results, we explicitly derive a symmetric equilibrium
for the same model as in [22, 4], but allowing for a shock process with jumps.
Based on the solution we demonstrate the expected effect of dissolving option
value and incorporate the limit of perfect competition as in [6].
2.1 Perfect competition
We would like to illustrate the role and meaning of the first order condition
by a “degenerate” case of the game. Baldursson and Karatzas [6] study
a perfectly competitive setting, where an individual firm’s action does not
influence the revenue opportunities of any other firm in the industry. Their
approach is to solve a social planner’s problem and then show under which
conditions it has the properties of an equilibrium capital process. As we
will see, the defining properties of equilibrium coincide with our first order
condition, so that we can address equilibrium determination more directly.
Afterwards, the connection to the social planner’s singular control problem
will be highlighted, but which is not necessary anymore.
So, consider a non-atomic continuum [0,∞) of homogeneous investors,
all owning a perpetual option to enter a common market. Exercising such an
option starts a non-callable stochastic profit stream. To model the underlying
uncertainty, let (Ω,F∞ , (F t )t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space satisfying
the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness.
An entering strategy is then a stopping time τ with respect to the given
filtration, i.e. the decision whether to exercise the option at any point in time
t has to be based on the information reflected by the σ-algebra F t . Formally,
the strategy space of each individual firm is T , the set of all stopping times
that take values in [0,∞].
Although investors are negligibly small so that individual entry does not
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affect the level of capital in the industry, the entering firms collectively gen-
erate an aggregate investment process. We identify the current capital stock,
denoted Qt, by the measure of firms having entered so far. An individual
firm will take this capital process as given and obtains as expected payoff
from entering at random time τ
j(τ |Q) , E
[∫ ∞
τ
pi(t, Qt) dt− kτ
]
. (2.1)
Since exit is not allowed and depreciation abstracted from for expositional
simplicity,1 the process (Qt)t≥0 belongs to the following class of feasible ag-
gregate investment processes:
A (q0) , {Q adapted, nondecreasing, left-continuous, with Q0 = q0 P-a.s.}.
Here, q0 > 0 is some given incumbent capital
2. The capital stock clearly is
assumed to influence any active firm’s instantaneous profit, which is for this
purpose modelled as a random field pi(ω, t, q) : Ω× [0,∞)× R+ → R, where
we suppress the argument ω as above when taking expectations. Dependence
on time t incorporates possible discounting and q is some capital level. Here,
we chose an infinite horizon, but note that one might as well consider a
finite horizon together with some scrap value function as terminal payoff,
conditional on having entered the market before.
Finally, the (investment) cost for exercising any of the options may be
random as well and is thus formalized by the stochastic process k.
In order for (2.1) to be well defined, we make the following
Assumption 1.
i. For any (ω, t) ∈ Ω× [0,∞), the mapping q 7→ pi(ω, t, q) is continuously
decreasing from pi(ω, t, 0) = +∞ to pi(ω, t,+∞) ≤ 0.
ii. For q ∈ R+ fixed, (ω, t) 7→ pi(ω, t, q) is progressively measurable.
iii. For any Q ∈ A (q0) with q0 > 0, pi(ω, t,Qt(ω)) is P⊗ dt-integrable.
Furthermore, we assign the following properties to the investment cost
process k.
1Depreciation would effectively only change the discount rate.
2We only consider strictly positive incumbent capital for convenience. It eases the
reconciliation of integrability with some necessary conditions for applying a stochastic
representation theorem below without elaborating a modification to avoid appearance of
negative auxiliary capital stocks.
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Assumption 2. The optional process (kt)t≥0 is a right-continuous super-
martingale, strictly positive for t ∈ R+ and k∞ = 0, P-a.s.
Assumption 2 is satisfied in the common case where the investment cost
is constant but discounted at a nonnegative optional or deterministic rate.
2.1.1 Characterization of equilibrium
We will not worry to solve the investors’ optimal stopping problems for arbi-
trary capital stock processes. In an equilibrium, optimal behaviour on behalf
of all firms — entering and refraining — limits the observational variety of
outcomes. In fact, because staying outside the market gives zero profit and
in our model there is always a positive measure of option holders not hav-
ing exercised yet, further exercise at any stopping time cannot yield positive
expected payoff in equilibrium. On the other hand, a positive measure of
firms enter at any time when aggregate investment increases and this deci-
sion needs to be optimal. Consequently, an equilibrium is characterized by
the corresponding capital stock process as follows.
Definition 2.1. Q∗ ∈ A (q0) is a perfect competition equilibrium process for
incumbent capital q0 ∈ R+ if supτ∈T j(τ |Q∗) — the option value given Q∗ —
is zero, and exercising is optimal whenever Q∗ increases, i.e. at all stopping
times τ ∗(x) , inf{t ≥ 0|Q∗t > x}, x ≥ q0.
Note that at the times when equilibrium investment increases, all option
holders are indifferent whether to exercise immediately or to keep waiting,
possibly forever. Thus we may conclude that there is an equilibrium in indi-
vidual strategies where just enough firms enter at any such time to support
the aggregate equilibrium investment. The reasoning up to this point will
be formalized stronger when we determine the — as we will see unique —
equilibrium investment process in the following.
We directly start with the observation that the defining properties of an
equilibrium process are in fact a first order condition for an optimal process
in the stochastic control problem which we formulate now. For an economic
interpretation let us take the perspective of a fictitious social planner, like
it is common practice in finding perfectly competitive equilibria. Consider
that this authority can control how many firms enter at each moment, but
still without foresight. Its objective is to pursue an efficient irreversible in-
vestment process in the sense of maximizing the aggregate expected profit,
net of investment cost. If the firm level profit flow pi is inverse demand minus
variable production cost, the planner is benevolent in the classical meaning
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that consumer surplus shall be maximal while taking account of all incurred
costs. Formally, this leads to the stochastic control problem of maximizing
J(Q) , E
[∫ ∞
0
Π(t, Qt) dt−
∫ ∞
0
kt dQt
]
(2.2)
over all Q ∈ A (q0), where the random field Π : Ω× [0,∞)×R+ → R relates
to pi by
Π(ω, t, q) =
∫ q
0
pi(ω, t, y) dy. (2.3)
Consequently, it inherits measurability from Assumption 1 and is concave in
capital with continuous partial derivative Πq , ∂Π/∂q. Furthermore, by the
integrability assumption, the negative part of Π is also P⊗ dt-integrable for
fixed q ∈ R+.
By (2.3), attainable revenue is nonnegative, but to have a meaningful
stochastic control problem, we impose the additional
Assumption 3. The process (ω, t) 7→ supq∈R+ Π(ω, t, q)+ is P⊗dt-integrable.
In combination with Assumption 2, the value of the problem is finite and
it suffices to consider admissible controls with bounded expected cost.
Since the problem is of the monotone follower type with concave objective
functional J , one can solve it by the approach developed by Bank and Riedel
[10]. The starting point is to formulate a first order condition for potential
solutions, which turns out to be very illustrative for our purpose, because
the relation between the social planner’s control problem and equilibrium
determination becomes immediate.
The first order condition for an optimal control policy is based on the
following gradient, which has also been used by Bertola [12] for a more specific
single-agent problem. Let ∇J(Q) denote for any Q ∈ A (q) the unique
optional process such that
∇J(Q)τ = E
[∫ ∞
τ
Πq(t, Qt) dt
∣∣∣∣F τ ]− kτ for all stopping times τ ∈ T .
(2.4)
Heuristically, it describes the marginal profit from irreversible investment
at any stopping time, see the discussion below. The first order condition
in terms of this gradient in fact coincides with our given definition of an
equilibrium investment process since Πq = pi.
Proposition 2.2. If Assumptions 1,2, and 3 are satisfied, a control policy
Q∗ ∈ A (q0) maximizes the social planner’s objective (2.2) if it is a perfect
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competition equilibrium process according to Definition 2.1, because then
∇J(Q∗) ≤ 0 and
∫ ∞
0
∇J(Q∗)s dQ∗s = 0 P-a.s. (2.5)
Proof. We first show the claimed optimality, so let Q∗ ∈ A (q0) satisfy (2.5)
and assume it causes finite investment cost. Further consider an arbitrary
Q ∈ A (q0) with J(Q) > −∞. Since Π is concave in q by its definition (2.3)
and Assumption 1, we can estimate
J(Q)− J(Q∗) = E
[∫ ∞
0
Π(t, Qt)− Π(t, Q∗t ) dt−
∫ ∞
0
kt d(Qt −Q∗t )
]
≤ E
[∫ ∞
0
Πq(t, Q
∗
t )
(
Qt −Q∗t
)
dt−
∫ ∞
0
kt d(Qt −Q∗t )
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
Πq(t, Q
∗
t )
(∫ t
0
d(Qs −Q∗s)
)
dt−
∫ ∞
0
kt d(Qt −Q∗t )
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
s
Πq(t, Q
∗
t ) dt d(Qs −Q∗s)−
∫ ∞
0
ks d(Qs −Q∗s)
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
∇J(Q∗)s d(Qs −Q∗s)
]
.
In the second last line, we use Fubini’s theorem to change the order of in-
tegration. By the first order condition (2.5), the last expression above is
nonpositive. So we conclude J(Q) ≤ J(Q∗).
Regarding the assumed admissibility of Q∗ ∈ A (q0) satisfying (2.5), go
through the steps above backward with Q ≡ q0 to obtain that J(Q∗) ≥ 0 and
that consequently the expected investment cost of Q∗ is finite, so the control
is admissible.
Now we show that if Q∗ ∈ A (q0) is a perfect competition equilibrium
process according to Definition 2.1, it satisfies (2.5). Remember Πq = pi and
an individual firm’s objective (2.1). So, the Definition 2.1 of an equilibrium
investment process translates into (i) E[∇J(Q∗)τ ] ≤ 0 for all stopping times
τ ∈ T , which implies the inequality in (2.5), and (ii) E[∇J(Q∗)τ∗(x)] = 0 for
all x ∈ R+ and τ ∗(x) as in Definition 2.1. To deduce the required equality,
note that τ ∗ is the right-continuous inverse of the monotone Q∗ (see also
(2.8) below). This permits to use the change-of-variable formula∫ ∞
0
∇J(Q∗)s dQ∗s =
∫ ∞
0
∇J(Q∗)τ∗(x) dx P-a.s.,
cf. [6]. The integrand on the right-hand side is zero P-a.s. by the equilibrium
definition, which completes the proof. o.e.d.
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The intuition conveyed by the first order condition reveals the connec-
tion between the optimal control problem and equilibrium determination.
Given some capital stock process, the social planner may consider a further
marginal investment at any stopping time. Irreversibility then induces a
flow of marginal profit from that moment onward. If the capital process is
optimal, marginal investment cannot be profitable, corresponding to entry
of additional small investors. On the other hand, optimality requires that
marginal profit is not negative at any time when investment occurs, because
reducing investment would then be beneficial by continuity of Πq, resp. pi.
This principle corresponds to consistency of the small investors’ optimal entry
times with increases of aggregate capital.
The first order condition is sufficient for an optimal control in the social
planner’s problem. One could now continue by solving the aggregate in-
vestment problem and verifying whether the equilibrium properties are also
necessary. However, when marginal instantaneous revenue satisfies the Inada
condition of Assumption 1, one can pursue the approach of Bank and Riedel
and construct a control process satisfying the first order condition by means
of a stochastic representation theorem. This way is much more direct for
equilibrium determination, since the fact that the identified capital process
will also maximize the social planner’s objective is a helpful interpretation,
but not needed as an intermediate result.
2.1.2 Construction of equilibrium investment
The first order condition is not constructive because the inequality will only
be binding when investment occurs. One does obtain equality at an arbitrary
point in time by considering to start with zero capital at that instant and
determining an “initial” investment size such that equality holds, conditional
on equality also holding at all subsequent investments. The resulting family
of equations can actually be summarized by a single backward equation,
which the process of such “initial capital levels” has to satisfy. Specifically,
the stochastic representation problem arises to find the (unique) optional
process L satisfying
E
[∫ ∞
τ
pi(t, sup
τ≤u<t
Lu) dt
∣∣∣∣F τ ]−kτ = 0 for all stopping times τ ∈ T . (2.6)
Our assumptions ensure the existence of a solution to this problem, from
which we can directly deduce a capital process satisfying the first order con-
dition. In comparison to (2.5), we replaced Q∗ by the running supremum
(starting at τ) of the process L to be determined, while enforcing equality
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to hold P-a.s. Bank and El Karoui [8] discuss this representation problem
in detail and we can use their central existence result [8, Theorem 3]. Under
some quite common specifications of pi and k, one can also derive closed-
form solutions. We will discuss these in the oligopoly case below, the limit
of which turning out to be the present perfectly competitive equilibrium.
Once we derived the seemingly abstract process L, we obtain the so-
cial planner’s optimal control policy — resp. perfect competition equilibrium
process — as follows.
Proposition 2.3. Under Assumptions 1,2, and 3, the unique perfect com-
petition equilibrium process for incumbent capital q0 ∈ R+ is given by
Q∗ , q0 ∨
(
sup
0≤u<t
Lu
)
t≥0
, (2.7)
where L is the unique optional process solving representation problem (2.6).
Proof. Q∗ belongs to A (q0), so it is feasible. Use the definition of Q∗ and
the representation (2.6) of kτ to obtain for any τ ∈ T
j(τ |Q∗) = E
[∫ ∞
τ
pi(t, Q∗t ) dt− kτ
]
= E
[∫ ∞
τ
pi(t, q0 ∨ sup
0≤u<t
Lu) dt−
∫ ∞
τ
pi(t, sup
τ≤u<t
Lu) dt
]
As pi is decreasing in q, the last expectation is nonpositive.
Now, fix an x ≥ q0 and the corresponding τ ∗(x) ∈ T . Then, for any
t > τ ∗(x), q0 ∨ sup0≤u<t Lu = supτ∗(x)≤u<t Lu by the definition of Q∗, so the
two integrands cancel. Thus, τ ∗(x) yields zero payoff and is consequently
optimal.
Uniqueness follows from optimality of Q∗ for the strictly concave objective
functional of the social planner. Optimality for the social planner’s problem
follows from Proposition 2.2. o.e.d.
Combining our results up to this point, we have a quite direct, rigor-
ous proof for existence and uniqueness of a perfect competition equilibrium.
In equilibrium, optimal entry timing merely yields zero expected net profit,
implying that we may expect consistency of individual with aggregate be-
haviour.
2.1.3 Myopic optimal stopping
We close the discussion of perfect competition by illustrating the familiar
connection between singular control problems and optimal stopping. Since
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the social planner’s problem is of the monotone follower type, it can also be
solved by determining the optimal stopping time to install each capital unit
x ∈ R+. The optimal control process is then given by the right-continuous
inverse of this family of stopping times:
Q∗t = sup{x ∈ [0,∞) : τ ∗(x) < t} t ∈ [0,∞). (2.8)
This is actually how Baldursson and Karatzas [6] determine the equilibrium
investment process. In the current context, the stopping problems are given
the interpretation of optimal entry by myopic investors.
These hypothetical agents solve similar stopping problems as rational
ones, they only assume that aggregate capital remains fixed forever at some
level, say x ≥ 0. In all other respects, they have the same knowledge as
the rational agents. Formally, the myopic agents evaluate any stopping time
τ ∈ T by
jm(τ |x) , E
[∫ ∞
τ
pi(t, x) dt− kτ
]
.
By the proof of 2.3 it is easy to see that τ ∗(x) is optimal for a myopic firm
facing the specific capital level x ≥ q0.
With the help of the representation theorem, one can determine the my-
opic stopping times simultaneously, which would otherwise have to be cal-
culated by a continuum of Snell envelopes. However, they become now a
by-product, since the equilibrium properties follow in our case directly from
the representation theorem.
2.2 The game
We now model a continuous time capital accumulation game between a fixed
number of firms, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n. The firms may repeatedly make
investments of arbitrary size (we do not require the investment rates to be
defined) to increase their respective capital stocks. We assume a continuous
revelation of uncertainty regarding future payoffs and allow the firms to con-
dition their investment decisions on the accumulated information. Formally,
let (Ω,F∞ , (F t )t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual
conditions of right-continuity and completeness. Then, based on its given
initial capital stock qi ∈ R+, every firm has to choose a strategy Qi from
A (qi), its class of feasible investment processes, where for any q ∈ R+,
A (q) , {Q adapted, left-continuous, nondecreasing, with Q0 = q, P-a.s.}.
Thus, the firms are restricted to using open loop strategies, since the in-
vestment decisions during the run of the game only depend on information
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regarding the exogenous uncertainty, but not on deviations in the opponents’
capital stocks. Strategic interaction then only affects the initial choices of
investment processes3.
The strategies are mapped to payoffs via profit flows that depend on the
current capital levels of all firms, net of a linear investment cost. Denote
the aggregate capital by Q ,
∑
j=1,...,nQ
j, such that firm i faces opponent
capital Q−i , Q−Qi. Given a combination of strategies from ∏nj=1A (qj),
firm i then receives the payoff
J(Qi|Q−i) , E
[∫ ∞
0
Π(t, Qit, Q
−i
t ) dt−
∫ ∞
0
kt dQ
i
t
]
. (2.9)
The profit flow is specified by the random field Π : Ω × [0,∞) × R2+ → R,
where the argument ω will typically be suppressed. Assume for example that
it arises from spot competition between the firms in a common market. We
give Π some more structure to ensure that the payoffs are well defined.
Assumption 4.
i. For any (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0,∞), the mapping (qi, q−i) 7→ Π(ω, t, qi, q−i)
is twice continuously differentiable. For q−i ∈ R+ fixed, the partial
derivative Πqi strictly decreases in q
i.
ii. For (qi, q−i) ∈ R2+ fixed, (ω, t) 7→ Π(ω, t, qi, q−i) is progressively mea-
surable.
iii. For any (Qi, Q−i) ∈ A (0)2, Π(ω, t, Qit(ω), Q−it (ω)) is P⊗dt-integrable.
Since we will make frequent use of the partial derivative Πqi in different
contexts, we define the function pi ≡ Πqi for notational simplicity. Note that
since Π is concave in qi, pi(ω, t, Qit(ω), Q
−i
t (ω)) is P ⊗ dt-integrable for any
(Qi, Q−i) ∈ A (qi)×A (q−i) with qi > 0, especially for Qi ≡ qi.
Concerning the investment cost process k, Assumption 2 is maintained.
Consequently, apart from individual initial capital levels qi, the firms are
homogeneous.
With these assumptions, the payoffs are well defined, taking values in
R ∪ {−∞}. Determining firm i’s optimal choice of a strategy against a
given process Q−i ∈ A (∑nj=1 qj − qi) specifying opponent capital amounts
3Besides considerable technical difficulties, the choice of open loop strategies can be
justified at the modelling stage if firms are not able to observe the opponents’ capital
stocks.
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to solving a stochastic control problem of the monotone follower type (see
Section 2.4) with value function
V (qi, Q−i) , sup
Q∈A (qi)
J(Q|Q−i). (2.10)
So we can close the description of the game by a standard Nash equilibrium
concept.
Definition 2.4. (Q∗1 , . . . , Q∗n) is an open loop equilibrium if for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, Q∗i ∈ A (qi) and J(Q∗i |Q∗−i) = V (qi, Q∗−i).
To solve the individual control problems arising with open loop strategies
and to determine if there is a best reply for firm i to a given set of strategies
(Qj)j∈{1,...,n},j 6=i, we can use results from the literature on monotone follower
problems (cf. [19, 6, 7]). However, the presence of the exogenous process Q−i
induces that the verification is limited to a case-by-case basis. In order to
actually determine an equilibrium, where consistency is the main new issue,
we need to adapt the related techniques to our purposes.
Before considering equilibria for arbitrary initial capital levels, we present
the case of homogeneous initial capital separately, where the stochastic re-
presentation theorem already used for perfect competition can be applied.
2.3 Symmetric equilibrium
To be sure that any equilibrium exists, we have to specify the strategic prop-
erties of capital some more, about which we have said nothing so far. For
instance, it is common in the oligopoly literature to distinguish between
strategic complements and strategic substitutes. In capital accumulation
games with individual capital stocks typically the latter is assumed, i.e. op-
ponent capital has a negative influence on the profitability of own capital.
For obtaining a symmetric equilibrium, we do not need to require strategic
substitutes, but at least that the capital stocks are not too strong comple-
ments.
Assumption 5. Πqiqi + (n− 1)Πqiq−i < 0
Since instantaneous revenue is by assumption concave in own capital, As-
sumption 5 means that marginal revenue must not increase too strongly in
opponent capital. In particular, if we increase the capital stocks on the sym-
metric expansion path, marginal revenue of an individual firm should still
decrease. This condition also appears in the literature on Cournot competi-
tion [34, Sec. 4.2]. It is among the weakest known requirements to guarantee
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uniqueness of equilibrium in the static Cournot game with payoff Π. If the
capital stocks are indeed strategic substitutes, i.e. Πqiq−i ≤ 0, this implies
Assumption 5 and also existence of the static game’s equilibrium.
For a symmetric open loop equilibrium, we now have to determine a
capital stock process which is optimal for any firm if the opponents follow
the same investment policy. Since the individual control problems are of
the monotone follower type, optimal behaviour in equilibrium can be verified
by the first order condition which was introduced for the social planner’s
problem above. Consequently, we look for a process Q∗1(= 1
n
Q∗) such that
∇J(Q∗1 |(n− 1)Q∗1) (2.11)
satisfies (2.5). Note that the gradient is still based on the partial derivative
Πqi only, since opponent capital just happens to coincide in the symmetric
equilibrium. Then, since the required concavity and integrability conditions
are satisfied, one can repeat the proof of Proposition 2.2 to infer optimal
investment.
Again, we try to determine a capital process satisfying the first order
condition with the help of an auxiliary optional process L, which solves the
following modified stochastic representation problem.
E
[∫ ∞
τ
Πqi(t, sup
τ≤u<t
Lu, (n− 1) · sup
τ≤u<t
Lu) dt
∣∣∣∣F τ ]− kτ = 0 for all τ ∈ T .
(2.12)
Under our monotonicity Assumption 5, we can once more apply the repre-
sentation theorem of Bank and El Karoui to assure existence of a solution L,
provided the range of marginal revenue is sufficiently large:
Proposition 2.5. Let Assumptions 2, 4 and 5 hold. Suppose further for any
(ω, t) ∈ Ω× [0,∞), limq→0 Πqi(ω, t, q, q) =∞ and limq→∞Πqi(ω, t, q, q) = 0.
Set qi = q0 ∈ R+, i = 1, . . . , n.
Then, there is a symmetric open loop equilibrium where
Q∗i , q0 ∨
(
sup
0≤u<t
Lu
)
t≥0
(2.13)
for all i = 1, . . . , n, and L is the unique optional process solving representa-
tion problem (2.12).
Remark 2.6. We do not prove uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium here,
since it would involve construction of an additional auxiliary optimization
problem. This is done in the general case below, which covers the present
setting.
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Proof. The process Q∗i defined as above belongs to A (qi). We only need to
show that (2.11) satisfies the first order condition (2.5), because we can then
repeat the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Indeed, for any stopping time τ ∈ T we have due to the monotonicity
Assumption 5 and the definition of Q∗i
∇J i(Q∗i|Q∗−i)τ = E
[∫ ∞
τ
Πqi(t, Q
∗i
t , Q
∗−i
t ) dt
∣∣∣∣F τ ]− kτ
≤ E
[∫ ∞
τ
Πqi(t, sup
τ≤u<t
Lu, (n− 1) · sup
τ≤u<t
Lu) dt
∣∣∣∣F τ ]− kτ ,
where the last expression is zero exactly by representation (2.12). To verify
that the equality in (2.5) holds true P-a.s., consider dQ∗is > 0. Then, L
reaches an all-time high at s and Q∗it = sup0≤u<t Lu = sups≤u<t Lu > 0 for
all t > s. o.e.d.
With Proposition 2.5, we obtained a quite short, rigorous proof for an
equilibrium as in [22], but for a conceivably general formulation of the game.
In particular, we did not use any Markov assumption and there may also
be jumps of an exogenous shock. Below, we will explicitly solve Grenadier’s
model in presence of a Le´vy process and conduct some further analysis re-
lating to option premia.
Continuing with the general model, we ask about the influence of hetero-
geneous initial capital on equilibrium existence and characteristics, since we
are particularly interested in the strategic effect of capital stocks. However,
while the type of individual optimization problems remains the same, we
cannot apply the representation theorem with heterogeneous capital levels
anymore. For instance in the basic Grenadier model, the Inada conditions
on marginal revenue are violated for any given opponent capital.
In the following, we will still characterize equilibrium by the first or-
der condition prevailing above. It requires nevertheless some work to adapt
the available methods for solving monotone follower problems to our needs.
Therefore, the next section is entirely devoted to such control problems.
While they can be interpreted as determining a best reply on behalf of firm
i, we will later formulate further auxiliary instances, so the treatment is kept
more general in notation.
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2.4 Monotone follower problems
Consider now the problem of a single agent to choose a process Q ∈ A (q),
where q ∈ R+ is given, in order to maximize the objective function
JM(Q) , E
[∫ ∞
0
F (t, Qt) dt−
∫ ∞
0
kt dQt
]
. (2.14)
The superscript “M” stands for monopolist. Concerning the random field F ,
we make similar assumptions as on Π above, only neglecting the exogenous
process Q−i.
Assumption 1’.
i. For any (ω, t) ∈ Ω× [0,∞), the mapping q 7→ F (ω, t, q) is continuously
differentiable. The partial derivative Fq strictly decreases in q.
ii. For q ∈ R+ fixed, (ω, t) 7→ F (ω, t, q) is progressively measurable.
iii. For any Q ∈ A (0), F (ω, t,Qt(ω)) is P⊗ dt-integrable.
Fq(t, Qt) is analogously P ⊗ dt-integrable for any given Q ∈ A (q) with
q > 0 by concavity of F in q.
Given Assumption 1’, we can define the value function of the monopolist
V M(q) , sup
Q∈A (q)
JM(Q). (2.15)
In the following we try to find conditions under which there exists an optimal
strategy Q∗ ∈ A (q), i.e. which attains JM(Q∗) = V M(q), and to determine
it.
2.4.1 First order condition
It will turn out very helpful for our purposes to characterize potential so-
lutions to monotone follower problems by a first order condition as above.
However, contrary to its use by Bank and Riedel in [10] and in the further
applications to singular control [7, 9] as a sufficient condition only, we are
interested in necessity, too.
For stating the first order condition, we again need to define the gradient
∇JM(Q), which is for any Q ∈ A (q) the unique optional process satisfying
∇JM(Q)S = E[
∫∞
S
Fq(t, Qt) dt|F S ]− kS for all stopping times S ∈ T .
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Proposition 2.7. If Assumptions 1’ and 2 are satisfied, there exists a control
policy Q∗ ∈ A (q) which attains V M(q) iff
∇JM(Q∗) ≤ 0 and
∫ ∞
0
∇JM(Q∗)s dQ∗s = 0 P-a.s. (2.16)
Proof. For sufficiency, see e.g. [7].
For necessity, assume there exists an optimal process Q∗ ∈ A (q) with
JM(Q∗) = V M(q). Then in particular the value of the problem is finite. To
see that there cannot exist a stopping time S ∈ T such that ∇JM(Q∗)S > 0,
note that due to the continuity of Fq and linear investment cost, a sufficiently
small extra investment at S would be profitable.
It remains to show ∇JM(Q∗)S = 0 for all points of increase S of Q∗, since
these carry the measure dQ∗. A point of increase is a stopping time S ∈ T
such that Q∗t > Q
∗
S for all t > S almost surely. Suppose S ∈ T is a point of
increase and fix  > 0. Define the stopping time S , inf{t ≥ S|Q∗t ≥ Q∗S+}.
Furthermore define the control process Q by
Qt =
{
Q∗t∧S if t ≤ S
Q∗t −  else.
Then Q ∈ A (q) and is a feasible continuation policy from Q∗S. Let JM(Q)S
denote the conditional continuation value of control Q from S on. From the
definition of Q, we obtain
JM(Q∗)S − JM(Q)S

=
1

E
[∫ S
S
F (t, Q∗t )− F (t, Q∗S) dt+
∫ ∞
S
F (t, Q∗t )− F (t, Q∗t − ) dt
∣∣∣∣F S ]
− 1

E
[∫
[S,S]
kt d(Q
∗ −Q)t
∣∣∣∣F S ].
For any , this expression is nonnegative due to the hypothesized optimality
of Q∗. Since it approaches ∇JM(Q∗)S in the limit, the gradient must be zero
at S.
To see that the claimed limit is true, note that S tends to S almost
surely, because the latter is a point of increase. MoreoverR , Q∗ − Q ∈
A (0) and satisfies RS = , almost surely. With the level passage times
τR

(l) , inf{t ≥ 0|Rt > l} we can make the following change of variable as
in [6].∫
[S,S]
kt dR

t =
∫
[0,∞)
kt1{S,S}(t) dRt =
∫ ∞
0
kτR (l)1{S,S}(τ
R(l)) dl
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Note that
τR

(l) ≥ S ⇔ l ≥ 0 and τR(l) ≤ S ⇔ l < .
So, the cost difference equals
∫
[0,)
kτR (l) dl. Consequently, the limit above is
lim
→0
1

E
[∫
[S,S]
kt d(Q
∗ −Q)t
∣∣∣∣F S ] = lim→0 1
∫
[0,)
E
[
kτR (l)
∣∣F S ] dl = kS,
since k is right-continuous. o.e.d.
Note that because of the strict concavity assumption, there is at most
one feasible control process that is optimal, resp. satisfies the first order
condition. The gradient ∇JM(Q)S can be interpreted as the conditional
marginal profit of adding an extra capital unit at the stopping time S, when
capital follows the process Q. The intuition of the first order condition is that
when the gradient is positive at some stopping time, a small extra investment
is profitable. On the other hand, investment should not occur in the region
where it is negative, since similarly reducing such an investment would be
beneficial.
With Proposition 2.7, we can now focus on identifying feasible control pro-
cesses that satisfy the first order condition. In the given references [10, 9, 7],
the existence of such a policy is achieved via a representation theorem, which
confirms that there exists a solution of a stochastic representation problem
(see [8]) inspired by the first order conditions. The running supremum of the
solution to the representation problem is the sought optimal control process.
However, in order to apply the representation theorem, an Inada condition
on Fq is required, which poses a problem in our oligopoly application. In
typical instances of the revenue stream, installed capital by the opponents of
a firm prevents the marginal revenue of this firm from approaching infinity
for the first capital unit.
2.4.2 Base capacity
We adapt the general approach to solving monotone follower problems like
(2.14) via their connection to optimal stopping (cf. [19]), which has been
briefly illustrated in terms of the myopic investors under perfect competition.
The approach consists of solving a family of auxiliary stopping problems
(entry of myopic investors) and deriving the optimal control process as the
inverse of the family of optimized stopping times.
By means of the social planner’s monotone follower problem, we showed
that if one can solve the proposed stochastic representation problem, the
passage times of the solution provide the family of stopping times needed
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to construct the optimal control process. However, this connection was not
even needed because of resorting to the first order condition.
In case the representation problem is not applicable due to the mentioned
Inada condition, the principle is nevertheless valid and we will construct
the optional signal process by adapting the existence proof of Bank and
El Karoui [8]. Moreover, we care again for necessity of existence of such
a signal process, too. Its passage times will be optimal for the auxiliary
myopic stopping problems and tracking its running supremum will be an
optimal policy for our monotone follower problem as well. We also attempt
an economic interpretation of the principle.
Let us first state the result and then go through the proof and involved
concepts step by step. To begin, define for any stopping time S ∈ T also
the set of stopping times
T (S) , {T ∈ T |T ≥ S, P-a.s.}.
The signal process to be constructed now is a base capacity L satisfying
Ls = sup
{
l ∈ R+
∣∣∣∣ ess infT∈T (s) E
[∫ T
s
Fq(t, l) dt+ kT
∣∣∣∣F s ] = ks} ∨ 0 (2.17)
for all s ∈ [0,∞). Formally, it yields the maximal (capital level) l for
which stopping immediately is optimal in the auxiliary stopping problem
parametrized with l.
Concerning its economic interpretation, we adapt the term “base capac-
ity” from Riedel and Su [31], since it turns out that a firm will never want
to operate with less capital, even if it were given the one-time chance to sell
some capital and continue expanding. In terms of optimal stopping, it is for
any capital level l < Ls not profitable to delay marginal investment to any
future stopping time. Contrarily, for capital l > Ls, there exists a stopping
time T ≥ s such that the opportunity cost of delaying marginal investment
until T is negative.
Existence of this base capacity is connected to our optimization problem
as follows.
Proposition 2.8. If Assumptions 1’ and 2 are satisfied, there exists a control
policy Q∗ ∈ A (q) which attains V M(q) iff there exists an optional process L,
taking values in [0,∞) and satisfying (2.17) for all s ∈ [0,∞) almost surely.
Q∗ and L are then related by Q∗t = q ∨ sup0≤u<t Lu for all t ∈ [0,∞).
L takes values in [0,+∞) almost surely if for all (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0,∞),
limq→∞ Fq(ω, t, q) ≤ 0.
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We prove the proposition in a series of lemmata, collecting also the rele-
vant results from the literature.
As a first step, we recall the well-known relation between this control
problem and optimal stopping problems. One can write the payoff from any
Q ∈ A (q) in terms of its inverse, i.e. the level passage times
τQ(l) , inf{t ≥ 0|Qt > l} ∈ T for any l ∈ [q,+∞) (2.18)
by a change-of-variable formula.
Lemma 2.9. Under Assumptions 1’ and 2, the following holds for any Q ∈
A (q):
JM(Q)− JM(q) =
∫ ∞
q
E
[∫ ∞
τQ(l)
Fq(t, l) dt− kτQ(l)
]
dl
≤
∫ ∞
q
ess sup
τ∈T
E
[∫ ∞
τ
Fq(t, l) dt− kτ
]
dl
=
∫ ∞
q
E
[∫ ∞
0
Fq(t, l) dt
]
dl
−
∫ ∞
q
ess inf
τ∈T
E
[∫ τ
0
Fq(t, l) dt+ kτ
]
dl
Proof. See e.g. [6], Lemma 2. o.e.d.
The proof is based on Fubini’s theorem and relies on the monotonicity of
Q. Once the lth capital unit is installed at cost kτQ(l), the marginal revenue
Fq(t, l) accrues at all future times t, independent of subsequent investments.
Thus, one can decide at which (random) time to install the lth capital unit
optimally. On the other hand, if one can find a process Q∗ ∈ A (q) whose
passage times τQ
∗
(l) actually attain the values of the optimal stopping prob-
lems, this control must be optimal.
The last equality in the lemma states that instead of maximizing the
profit from installing the lth capital unit, one can equivalently minimize the
associated opportunity cost.
The stopping problems in Lemma 2.9 with fixed l ∈ R+ are classically
solved with the help of the Snell envelopes
Z l(s) = ess inf
T∈T (s)
E
[∫ T
0
Fq(t, l) dt+ kT
∣∣∣∣F s ] , s ∈ [0,∞). (2.19)
Z l coincides almost surely with the largest submartingale dominated by the
reward-upon-stopping
∫ s
0
Fq(t, l) dt+ ks, and it is optimal to stop as soon as
Z l touches this bound, cf. [18].
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Of course, only future payments influence the decision whether to stop
or to keep waiting, so we look at the following related family of stopping
problems.
Y l(S) = ess inf
T∈T (S)
E
[∫ T
S
Fq(t, l) dt+ kT
∣∣∣∣F S ] , S ∈ T , l ∈ R+. (2.20)
Note that Y l(S) ≤ kS.
In the present setting, one can treat this family of stopping problems
in a unified way because of the continuity and monotonicity in l. We cite
the following results from [8], which are only slightly modified as we restrict
ourselves to nonnegative values of l and a positive cost process k.
Lemma 2.10. Under Assumptions 1’ and 2, there is a jointly measurable
mapping Y : Ω × [0,∞] × R+ → R, (ω, t, l) 7→ Y l(ω, t) with the following
properties:
i. For l ∈ R+ fixed, Y l : Ω× [0,∞]→ R is an optional process such that
Y l(S) = ess inf
T∈T (S)
E
[∫ T
S
Fq(t, l) dt+ kT
∣∣∣∣F S ] , P-a.s. (2.21)
for every stopping time S ∈ T .
ii. For any l ∈ R+, S ∈ T , the stopping time
T lS , inf{t ≥ S|Y l(t) = kt}
is optimal in (2.20), that is,
Y l(S) = E
[∫ T lS
S
Fq(t, l) dt+ kT lS
∣∣∣∣F S
]
.
iii. For fixed (ω, s) ∈ Ω× [0,∞], the mapping l 7→ Y l(ω, s) is continuously
decreasing.
Proof. See [8], Lemma 4.12. o.e.d.
Consequently, there is a well-behaved version of the collection of value
functions (2.20), which induces that our base capacity is well-defined. For Y
as in Lemma 2.10, define the process L by
L(ω, s) = sup
{
l ∈ R+
∣∣Y l(ω, s) = k(ω, s)} ∨ 0, (2.22)
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for (ω, s) ∈ Ω× [0,∞).
Bank and El Karoui compare L to a “Gittins index”, since it determines
the maximal value of l, for which stopping immediately is optimal. Due
to the derived monotonicity, such a supremum is well defined. A Gittins
index represents the current profitability of a payoff stream by offering a
fixed reward-upon-stopping, such that it is better to cash in on the reward
immediately than to postpone the decision.
This is in fact an opportunity cost decision, which we propose as in-
terpretation, since here l is neither a reward nor needed as a measure for
profitability.
Suppose l > Ls. Then, by definition, there exists a stopping time T ∈
T (s), such that
E
[∫ T
s
Fq(t, l) dt+ kT
∣∣∣∣F s ]− ks < 0
⇔ E
[∫ T
s
Fq(t, l) dt
∣∣∣∣F s ] < ks − E [kT |F s ] . (2.23)
The expected additional revenue from installing the lth capital unit imme-
diately instead of at the future (random) time T on the left hand side is
less than the additional cost of investing immediately on the right hand
side. Considering only these two dates, the situation is identical4 afterwards,
whether investment has happened at s or at T .
Put differently, the first line is the opportunity cost of delaying investment
until T , which is a feasible plan since the latter is a stopping time. Whenever
the opportunity cost is negative, delaying investment is the better choice.
When contrarily l < Ls, the value of the option to delay investment is
zero, because then there is no feasible plan to delay which yields a positive
net reward (resp. negative opportunity cost). Due to the monotonicity, there
is at any state a maximal capital level such that immediate investment is
optimal, which is exactly the base capacity.
L is indeed a feasible signal process for investment, i.e. its running supre-
mum is a feasible control.
Lemma 2.11. The process L defined by (2.22) is optional. It takes values
in [0,+∞) almost surely if for all (ω, t) ∈ Ω× [0,∞), limq→∞ Fq(ω, t, q) ≤ 0.
Proof. See [8], Lemma 4.13. o.e.d.
Suppose now that L takes values in [0,+∞) almost surely, for instance
because the sufficient condition in Lemma 2.11 (resp. Proposition 2.8) is
4This fact is crucial for the current principle and we will refer to it in Chapter 3.
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satisfied. Then the process Q∗ given by Q∗t = q∨sup0≤u<t Lu for all t ∈ [0,∞)
is a feasible control from A (q). In order to prove optimality by Lemma 2.9,
it remains to show that the level passage times τQ
∗
(l) as defined above are
optimal for all l ∈ [q,∞).
However, the optimal stopping times T l0 from Lemma 2.10 are equivalent
to τQ∗(l) , inf{t ≥ 0|Q∗t ≥ l}. These are the smallest optimal stopping
times. One could now switch to the right-continuous modification of L like
in [19] and use a slightly different change-of-variable formula, but we show
that this is not necessary. In fact, the required stopping times τQ
∗
(l) are the
largest optimal ones.
Lemma 2.12. For any l ∈ R+, the stopping time τQ∗(l) is also optimal in
(2.20) for S = 0, that is,
Y l(0) = E
[∫ τQ∗ (l)
0
Fq(t, l) dt+ kτQ∗ (l)
]
.
Proof. First we prove the identity τQ∗(l) = T
l
0 for any l ∈ R+. Let t ∈ [0,∞),
then
T l0 = inf{t ≥ 0|Y l(t) = kt} ≤ t⇔ ∀t′ > t,∃s ≤ t′ : Y l(s) = ks
⇔ ∀t′ > t : sup
0≤u<t′
Lu ≥ l⇔ τQ∗(l) ≤ t.
Similarly,
T l0 = inf{t ≥ 0|Y l(t) = kt} ≥ t⇔ ∀s < t : Y l(s) < ks
⇔ sup
0≤u<t
Lu < l⇔ τQ∗(l) ≥ t.
Next, for any l ∈ R+ and l′ ∈ (l,∞), τQ∗(l′) ≥ τQ∗(l), since
τQ
∗
(l) ≥ t⇒ ∀u < t : Lu ≤ l⇒ ∀u < t : Y l′(u) < ku and
τQ∗(l
′) < t⇒ ∃u < t : Y l′(u) = ku,
a contradiction. Consequently, we also have for all l ∈ R+ and n ∈ N,
τQ∗(l +
1
n
) ≥ τQ∗(l), where the latter is the path-wise limit if we let n→∞.
Thus, we can take the limit
lim
n→∞
E
[∫ τQ∗ (l+ 1n )
0
Fq(t, l +
1
n
) dt+ kτQ∗ (l+ 1n )
]
=E
[∫ τQ∗ (l)
0
Fq(t, l) dt+ kτQ∗ (l)
]
= Y l(0).
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The last equality holds true because of optimality of τQ∗(l+
1
n
) and continuity
of Y l. Thus, τQ
∗
(l) is optimal. o.e.d.
Lemma 2.12 completes the proof of sufficiency in Proposition 2.8.
Now suppose to the contrary that there exists an optimal Q∗ ∈ A (q),
such that ∞ > JM(Q∗) = V M(q).
Lemma 2.13. If there exists Q∗ ∈ A (q) attaining JM(Q∗) = V M(q), then its
level passage times τQ
∗
(l) for any l ∈ R+ solve the optimal stopping problems
appearing in Lemma 2.9.
Proof. Q∗ satisfies the first order conditions in Proposition 2.7. Since the
τQ
∗
(l) are points of increase, ∇JM(Q∗)τQ∗ (l) = 0 for all l ∈ R+. Thus, for
any τ ∈ T ,
E
[∫ ∞
τQ∗ (l)
Fq(t, l ∨Q∗t ) dt− kτQ∗ (l)
]
= E
[∫ ∞
τQ∗ (l)
Fq(t, Q
∗
t ) dt− kτQ∗ (l)
]
≥
≥ E
[∫ ∞
τ
Fq(t, Q
∗
t ) dt− kτ
]
≥ E
[∫ ∞
τ
Fq(t, l ∨Q∗t ) dt− kτ
]
.
This implies
E
[∫ τQ∗ (l)
0
Fq(t, l) dt+ kτQ∗ (l)
]
= E
[∫ τQ∗ (l)
0
Fq(t, l ∨Q∗t ) dt+ kτQ∗ (l)
]
≤
≤ E
[∫ τ
0
Fq(t, l ∨Q∗t ) dt+ kτ
]
≤ E
[∫ τ
0
Fq(t, l) dt+ kτ
]
.
o.e.d.
Consequently, the existence of an optimal stopping time for each l ∈ R+
is a necessary condition for the existence of an optimal control process. If
we determine the family of optimal stopping times alternatively by Lemma
2.10 and consider (sup0≤u<t Lu)t∈[0,∞) of the resulting base capacity (2.22),
this must coincide with the left-continuous, optional process Q∗ because of
uniqueness and thus L <∞, almost surely. o.e.d.
Proposition 2.8 implies that any optimal control for a monotone follower
problem of this section and thus any best reply of some player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
to given strategies (Qj)j∈{1,...,n},j 6=i — whenever it exists — is of the form
(qi ∨ sup0≤u<t Liu)t∈[0,∞) for some optional signal process Li.
With these results fixed, we can now turn to the determination of equi-
libria of our game.
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2.5 Asymmetric equilibria
Without loss of generality, we order the firms in the following such that q1 ≤
· · · ≤ qn. For identifying an equilibrium, we now have to find a consistent
set of mutual best replies by each firm. In order to succeed with completely
arbitrary initial capital levels, we need to make a further assumption on the
strategic effect of capital, which is of course highly important for the existence
and characteristics of any equilibria. Like the maintained Assumption 5, the
following one is related to the literature on oligopoly theory and will be shown
to have very clear implications for equilibrium determination.
Assumption 6. Πqiqi − Πqiq−i < 0
This assumption is for instance automatically satisfied by Cournot-type
spot competition, because then it follows from inverse demand (resp. price)
decreasing in aggregate supply, see the explicit example below. If the capital
stocks are strategic substitutes, we assume that the influence of increasing
own capital on marginal revenue is stronger than increasing opponent capital
by the same amount. Assumption 6 actually implies that for a fixed level of
aggregate capital, instantaneous marginal revenue decreases in own installed
capital.
With this additional assumption, we can exploit the results of Section 2.4
to characterize existence conditions and actually provide a construction for
all equilibria of the following type.
Definition 2.14. An open loop equilibrium (Q∗1 , . . . , Q∗n) is an equalizing
equilibrium if Q∗i = qi ∨Q∗1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
In these equilibria, there is only investment by the currently smallest
firms. As Theorem 2.18 will show, the class is not restrictive under Assump-
tion 6, e.g. whenever we consider Cournot-type spot competition, indepen-
dent of the specific shock process and initial capital dispersion.
Our first result is that any equalizing equilibrium is exactly determined
by the solution of a single monotone follower problem.
Theorem 2.15. Under Assumptions 2, 4, 5, and 6 there exists for any
(q1, . . . , qn) ∈ Rn+ with 0 < q1 ≤ · · · ≤ qn an equalizing equilibrium of
the game iff there exists a control Qˆ ∈ A (q1) attaining Jˆ(Qˆ) = Vˆ (q1) ,
supQ∈A (q1) Jˆ(Q), where
Jˆ(Q) = E
[∫ ∞
0
Πˆ(t, Qt) dt−
∫ ∞
0
kt dQt
]
(2.24)
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and
Πˆ(ω, t, q) , 1{q≥q1}
∫ q
q1
pi(ω, t, l,
∑
j>1
qj ∨ l) dl (2.25)
for all (ω, t, q) ∈ Ω× [0,∞)× [0,∞); so maximization of Jˆ(Q) over A (q1)
is a monotone follower problem as in Section 2.4. Then, Q∗1 = Qˆ.
A sufficient condition for existence of an optimal control process is
lim
l→∞
pi(ω, t, l,
∑
j>1
qj ∨ l) ≤ 0 for all (ω, t) ∈ Ω× [0,∞).
We suppose strictly positive initial capital only for saving a further inte-
grability condition on the positive part of Πˆ. To prove the theorem, we need
the following lemma.
Lemma 2.16. Suppose Assumptions 2, 4, and 6 hold. Then, for any Q ∈
A (0) and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∇J(qi ∨ Q|∑j 6=i qj ∨ Q) satisfies the first order
condition (2.16) if ∇J(q1 ∨Q|∑j>1 qj ∨Q) does.
Proof. Suppose,∇J(q1∨Q|∑j>1 qj∨Q) satisfies (2.16). By the monotonicity
Assumption 6 and qi ≥ q1,
∇J(qi ∨Q|
∑
j 6=i
qj ∨Q) ≤ ∇J(q1 ∨Q|
∑
j>1
qj ∨Q),
which proves the first part. Further, if S ∈ T is a point of increase for qi∨Q,
then it is a point of increase for qi
′ ∨Q, i′ = 1, . . . , i. Thus, for any of these
i′ and t > S we have Qi
′
t = Q
1
t > q
i and
∑
j 6=i′(q
j ∨ Qt) =
∑
j>1(q
j ∨ Qt).
This implies ∇J(qi′ ∨Q|∑j 6=i′(qj ∨Q))S = ∇J(q1 ∨Q|∑j>1(qj ∨Q))S = 0
and proves the second part. o.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 2.15. We show in the appendix that under Assumption 5,
pi(ω, t, q,
∑
j>1 q
j ∨ q) is monotonically decreasing in q ∈ R+. Thus, Πˆ is
strictly concave on {q ≥ q1} and integrable due to integrability of pi(·) for
q > 0 following Assumption 4.
Note that for any Q ∈ A (q1) and (q2, . . . , qn) ∈ Rn−1+ , ∇J(Q|
∑
j>1 q
j ∨
Q) = ∇Jˆ(Q) by definition. This, Proposition 2.7, and Lemma 2.16 imply:
(q1 ∨Q∗1 , . . . , qn ∨Q∗1) is an equalizing equilibrium
⇔∇J(qi ∨Q∗1|
∑
j 6=i
qj ∨Q∗1) satisfies (2.16) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
⇔∇J(q1 ∨Q∗1|
∑
j>1
qj ∨Q∗1) satisfies (2.16)
⇔∇Jˆ(Q∗1) satisfies (2.16)
⇔∃Q∗1 ∈ A (q1) : Jˆ(Q∗1) = Vˆ (q1)
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With our assumptions on k and the stated sufficient condition we can
adapt the proof of Lemma 4.13 in [8] to infer that L < ∞, almost surely.
o.e.d.
Remark 2.17. If q1 = · · · = qn, Assumption 6 is not needed in the proof and
Assumption 5 needs only to hold on the symmetric path q−i = (n− 1)qi.
If there exists an equalizing equilibrium process, for instance when the
easy-to-check sufficient condition in Theorem 2.15 is satisfied, it is unique
and can be determined by solving the auxiliary monotone follower problem
as in Section 2.4.
Consider the associated signal process Lˆ = L∗1 .
Lˆs = sup
{
l ≥ q1
∣∣∣∣ ess infT∈T (s) E
[∫ T
s
pi(ω, t, l,
∑
j>1
qj ∨ l) dt+ kT
∣∣∣∣F s
]
= ks
}
∨ q1
(2.26)
Here, we restrict ourselves again to the relevant capital levels (not less than
q1 > 0) because then integrability of pi is ensured, cf. Assumption 4.
We observe that if firm i invests at time s, then in accordance with the
opportunity-cost-of-delaying principle derived in Section 2.4, since pi = Πqi .
Investment occurs only if Lˆ sets a new record, and then the investment deci-
sion would be completely identical, were the capital levels of the opponents
fixed forever at qj ∨ Lˆs = Q∗js , j 6= i.
Similarly where Qis > Lˆs, firm i would also have excess capital if the
opponents’ capital stocks always remained at the current levels. Thus, the
investment behaviour in equilibrium is equivalent to myopic investment.
The firms invest up to the best reply to the current capital stocks of the
opponents, conditional on simultaneous investment by equally-sized firms.
Subsequent investment occurs only if the exogenous conditions improve. For
larger firms, investment is ceteris paribus less profitable due to decreasing
marginal revenue.
Note that the base capacity Lˆ will depend on (q2, . . . , qn). Thus, the
equilibrium is in general not subgame perfect.
Using a similar proof, we further obtain an even stronger uniqueness re-
sult: In common settings, the class of equalizing equilibria is not restrictive,
so there are no other open loop equilibria. The argument relies on the concept
of cumulative best replies following Selten, which can be helpful in equilib-
rium determination when any player’s payoff depends only on the sum of the
opponent actions. Cumulative best replies are strategies that are optimal
and consistent with a given aggregate capital level. Taking this perspective,
we can show that under Assumption 6 there is for any hypothetical equilib-
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rium aggregate capital process a unique consistent signal process. All firms
want to track this process once it exceeds their respective initial capital.
Theorem 2.18. Under Assumptions 2,4, and 6, any open loop equilibrium
is an equalizing equilibrium.
Proof. There is an open loop equilibrium with aggregate capital Q∗ iff each
Q∗i ≤ Q∗, i = 1, . . . , n, is a cumulative best reply to Q∗, i.e. iff each
∇J(Q∗i |Q∗−Q∗i) satisfies the first order conditions (2.16). Then, the individ-
ual equilibrium capital processes also solve the following auxiliary monotone
follower problems.
Define Π˜(ω, t, q) = 1{q≥q1}
∫ q∧Q∗
q1
pi(ω, t, l, Q∗(ω, t) − l) dl. Assumption 6
implies that Π˜q(ω, t, q) = pi(ω, t, q, Q
∗(ω, t) − q) is monotonically decreasing
in q on (q1, Q∗(ω, t)).
Let now J˜(Q) , E
[∫∞
0
Π˜(t, Qt) dt−
∫∞
0
kt dQt
]
. Then, the gradient
∇J˜(Q∗1) = ∇J(Q∗1|Q∗ −Q∗1) satisfies the first order conditions (2.16), and
Q∗1 is the unique maximizer of J˜ over all Q ∈ A (q1) with Q ≤ Q∗. This
in turn implies that Q∗1 is the unique process from that subset such that
∇J(Q∗1|Q∗ −Q∗1) satisfies the first order conditions.
It follows easily that for each qj, j = 2, . . . , n, ∇J˜(qj ∨ Q∗1) satisfies
the first order conditions and we can conclude similarly that qj ∨ Q∗1 is
the respectively unique process from A (qj) not exceeding Q∗ such that
∇J(Q|Q∗−Q) satisfies the first order conditions, yielding Q∗j = qj ∨Q∗1 as
claimed. o.e.d.
With Theorems 2.15 and 2.18, we have completely characterized any open
loop equilibrium for a possibly general formulation of the game, only through
the strategic properties of capital stocks concerning instantaneous revenue.
In particular the nature of exogenous uncertainty is quite irrelevant for the
strategic value of capital and instantaneous Cournot mechanics extend per-
fectly to the “dynamic” game. Investment follows the opportunity-cost-of-
delay principle, which coincides with myopic investment also in our general
formulation.
We conclude that although a high capital stock deters opponents from
investing, it is not sufficiently profitable to build up capital by early, pre-
emptive investment. The implicit reduction of opponent investment is too
low to compensate for premature option exercise.
In order to enable a stronger, explicit influence on opponent investment,
we need to allow for feedback strategies.
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2.6 Explicit solutions
We now formulate an instance of the game to derive explicit solutions with
the help of the stochastic representation theorem as in [7]. Based on the
solution we discuss the effect of option value dispersion and show that perfect
competition as presented above is the limiting case. The specification of the
revenue stream and cost functions is that of Grenadier [22], except that we
allow for Le´vy processes with jumps for the exogenous shock process.
Suppose the firms obtain revenue from Cournot type spot competition,
where inverse demand is influenced by exogenous shocks. Given aggregate
capital Q, the revenue flow is of the form
eXtP (Qt)Q
i
t.
Typically, inverse demand is decreasing in capital, which already induces
Assumption 4 to hold. For the shock process X, we will allow any Le´vy
process without negative jumps. The firms discount revenue at a fixed rate
r > 0, also applying to the cost of adding capital, which is normalized to
one. Assume further inverse demand with constant elasticity α > 0, i.e.
P (q) = q−
1
α .
Then, in the notation of our game,
Π(ω, t, qi, q−i) = e−rteX(ω,t)(qi + q−i)−
1
α qi.
Suppose the integrability condition of Assumption 1 is satisfied. The con-
cavity requirement is now equivalent to α > 1 and Assumption 3 to α > n.
We fix homogeneous initial capital levels q1 = · · · = qn = q. Then, the
relaxation allowed by Remark 2.17 translates into α > 1
n
, which is weaker
than the concavity condition.
To identify the unique open loop equilibrium, we now have to find a pro-
cess L such that we can set Q∗it = q∨sup0≤u<t Lu for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
∇J(Q∗i |(n−1)Q∗i) satisfies the first order conditions (2.16). For the current
specification, it is easy to check that if α > 1
n
, pi(ω, t, q, (n− 1)q) monotoni-
cally decreases in q and has the Inada properties limq→0 pi(ω, t, q, (n− 1)q) =
∞ and limq→∞ pi(ω, t, q, (n − 1)q) = 0. This allows to apply the method of
[7]. We try to find the unique optional process L which solves the stochastic
representation problem
E[
∫ ∞
S
pi(t, sup
S≤u<t
Lu, (n−1) sup
S≤u<t
Lu) dt|F S ]−kS = 0 for any S ∈ T . (2.27)
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Given the Inada properties, existence of a solution is guaranteed by the
representation theorem in [8], which can be easily adapted. Starting from
any q and tracking the running supremum of L will then immediately satisfy
the first order conditions for equilibrium.
For the current specification, we can derive an explicit solution to (2.27).
Begin by guessing
Lt = n
−1καeαXt for t ∈ [0,∞), (2.28)
with some constant parameter κ (for fixed n). Consequently, investment
in equilibrium will occur whenever the factor X sets a new record, as one
expects for Markovian processes positively influencing revenue.
Using the Markov property of L given by (2.28), we can eventually elim-
inate S in (2.27) and by some manipulations like in [31] get to
κ
( αn
αn− 1
)
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rte− sup0≤u<t−Xu dt
]
=
1
r
E
[
e− sup0≤u<τ(r)−Xu
]
,
where τ(r) is an independent exponentially distributed time with rate r.
The distribution of the running supremum of a Le´vy process −X stopped
at an independent exponential time is for instance known in the following
case. If X has no negative jumps, Bertoin shows in [11, ch. VII] that the
distribution is again exponential with rate Φ−X(r), the Laplace exponent of
−X at r. Then, we obtain
κ
( αn
αn− 1
)
=
Φ−X(r)
r
(
1 + Φ−X(r)
) , κ∞. (2.29)
Here we can reproduce the results of Grenadier [22] and Back and Paulsen [4],
since if Xt = X0 + µt+ σBt for standard Brownian motion B and constants
µ and σ, the Laplace exponent is given by
Φ−X(r) =
µ+
√
µ2 + 2rσ2
σ2
.
Regarding jumps in both directions, one could exploit the results of Kuo and
Wang [26] for diffusions with jumps having a double exponential distribution
to obtain a similar formula.
The right hand side of (2.29) is constant, so κ is increasing in n, and so is
aggregate capital Q∗t = sup0≤u<t n · Lu. Thus increasing competition speeds
up investment in equilibrium and reduces the option value of waiting. In the
limit, κ converges to κ∞ as the number of firms becomes infinite.
This allows us to pass to the case of perfect competition. In fact, Q∞
given by Q∞t = sup0≤u<t κ
α
∞e
αXt solves the first order condition for a single
agent problem with spot revenue Π∞, where marginal revenue is given by
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Π∞q (ω, t, q) = e
−rteX(ω,t)P (q) = lim
n→∞
pi
(
ω, t, 1
n
q, n−1
n
q
)
. (2.30)
The last equality is easily checked in the current specification. This is the
problem solved by the social planner in presence of marginal investors, as
discussed in Section 2.1.
Thus, Q∞ is the aggregate capital process in a perfectly competitive equi-
librium, with zero option value for the infinitesimal firms waiting to enter the
market.
The driving force for the option value dispersion is the decreasing im-
portance of the investment externality qiP ′(q) (where q =
∑n
j=1 q
j), which
disappears in the limit (2.30). This is the classical Cournot observation, but
not a preemption effect like in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Closed loop strategies
We saw in the previous chapter that the implicit strategic effects of invest-
ment with open loop strategies are quite limited, independent of the particu-
lar formulation of the game. Since investment does not depend on the actual
capital stocks, each firm makes full use of the option value of waiting. The
latter is only reduced by increasing competition because the externality of
investment on own installed capital looses importance.
However, if we want to allow for explicit dynamic strategic interaction,
by means of feedback strategies, there are some severe technical difficulties
to be solved. These are explained by Back and Paulsen [4], who clarify that
the equilibrium of Grenadier, which is formulated in terms of thresholds for
the state to trigger investment, has to be understood in open loop strategies.
Optimal investment is typically singular, i.e. where it occurs, its rate
is undefined. Consequently, one cannot formulate the game with feedback
strategies relating to investment directly, if singular controls are not to be ex-
cluded a priori. Second, when the previous issue is circumvented by choosing
capital levels, for instance by sufficiently well behaved threshold functions,
a general problem with continuous-time games persists. The combination of
“natural” strategies might not uniquely define the evolution of the (state of
the) game. For these reasons, Back and Paulsen admit not to know how to
formulate the game with feedback strategies.
Nevertheless, the authors argue that there exists an equilibrium with
investment thresholds, where firms always invest at the Bertrand price. In
this case, comparable to perfect competition, the option value of waiting is
zero and investment occurs at the zero net present value threshold. It is
a frequent conjecture that preemption incentives completely eliminate the
option values.
Our aim in this chapter is to provide a mathematically rigorous frame-
work for a capital accumulation game between two firms with closed loop
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strategies that resolves the fundamental conceptual problems and allows to
derive subgame perfect equilibria formally.
In particular, we consider strategies of the Markovian type, which map
the state of the game to desirable capital levels. The state contains all payoff
relevant information of past play and is composed of an exogenous Markovian
shock and the current capital stocks. Consequently, we also define Markov
perfect equilibria.
Since the control problems arising in equilibrium verification are new,
we establish a verification theorem for the case when the strategies form
appropriate investment thresholds for the state. It enables us to examine
the setting of Grenadier [22] and formally prove existence of the “Bertrand”
equilibrium. While the Markovian strategies generating the open loop equi-
librium outcome of Chapter 2 do not form a Markov perfect equilibrium,
we actually determine a class of equilibria with similar investment behaviour
and with positive option values.
3.1 The game
We want to formulate a stochastic game in continuous time, in which the
players (two firms) strategically accumulate capital, by irreversible invest-
ment. Their respective objective is to maximize the value of a profit flow
depending on both capital levels and exogenous uncertainty, net of invest-
ment costs. Formally, when the capital stock processes of player i and the
opponent are Qi and Q−i, the payoff of player i is given by
J(Qi, Q−i) , E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtΠ(Xt, Qit, Q
−i
t ) dt−
∫ ∞
0
e−rt dQit
]
, (3.1)
with a constant positive discount rate r. Since we focus on the pure strategic
effect of capital commitment, the payoffs to the players differ only through
the capital stock processes. The instantaneous revenue function Π is further
affected by an exogenous stochastic process X, which is defined on the prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,P) and adapted to the filtration (F t )t≥0. Assume, the
latter satisfies the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness and
F∞ = F . Concerning the stochastic capital stock processes Qi and Q−i, we
allow the same class of processes available to the monopolist in the related
irreversible investment problem. For given initial capital q ∈ R+, any feasible
capital stock process has to belong to the class
A (q) , {Q adapted, right-continuous, nondecreasing, and Q0 ≥ q, P-a.s.}.
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Thus, investment decisions have to be conditioned on current accumulated
information only and capital is installed without delay. In contrast to the mo-
nopolist, who chooses a control policy from A (q), the capital stock processes
here will result from the strategies of the players.
For the payoffs (3.1) to be well defined, we make the following
Assumption 7.
i. Π : R×R2+ → R, (x, qi, q−i) 7→ Π(x, qi, q−i) is continuous and continu-
ously differentiable in qi. The partial derivative Πqi increases in x and
decreases in qi, respectively.
ii. e−rtΠ(Xt(ω), Qit(ω), Q
−i
t (ω)) is P ⊗ dt-integrable for any (Qi, Q−i) ∈
A (qi)×A (q−i).
Our assumption on marginal instantaneous revenue relates to the local
investment incentives of each firm, and gives some structure to the state
space. The profitability of investment decreases for fixed competitive output
q−i, which together with the monotonicity in the exogenous shock will be
helpful for the emergence of action and inaction regions. If there is further-
more an adverse influence of opponent capital on marginal revenue, i.e. if
Πqi decreases in q
−i as well, the capital stocks are strategic substitutes. This
will frequently be true, but we do not assume it for the entire state space a
priori.
This leads us to the strategies of the players. While the processes in A (q)
reflect the continuous revelation of uncertainty, we would like to enable the
players to condition their investment decisions explicitly on the evolution of
the capital stocks, too. Allowing reactions to deviating investment is neces-
sary to obtain subgame perfect equilibria. Instead of considering investment
processes adapted to a broadened filtration including the capital stock his-
tories, we take a Markovian state space approach.
However, if one tries to define investment as a function of the state of the
game, the following difficulty arises. Since the investment cost is linear, we
know from the monopolistic and open loop cases that investment is likely to
occur not in lumps, but continuously if the shock does not jump. Neverthe-
less is instantaneous investment in terms of the growth rate dQi unsuitable as
an action variable if we do not artificially bound the rate. Although typical
control paths in similar optimization problems are continuous, all exercise
of control occurs at singular events and with an undefined rate. This phe-
nomenon arises when one tries to keep a diffusion X off some barrier at
minimal effort, here corresponding to a price trigger strategy, for instance.
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Since we do not want to exclude such policies, the increments dQi are only
meaningful in integrals as for the investment cost in (3.1).
Our treatment of the open loop case hints at a possibility to reconcile
dynamic strategic decision making with the required properties of the re-
sulting capital stock processes and consistency across subgames. There we
showed that for any starting state the optimal investment policy is given by
tracking the running supremum of a certain signal process Li, once it exceeds
currently installed capital. Formally,
Qit = q
i
0 ∨ sup
0≤s≤t
Lis, t ∈ [0,∞), (3.2)
with fixed initial capital qi0. L
i is the base capacity below which the firm never
wants to operate. Such base capacities, which have to be optional processes,
are in principle suitable to be determined by strategies or functions of the
state of the game. The decisions of the players will then be related to the base
capacity. If it exceeds installed capital, the latter is adjusted by investment,
otherwise the signal is ignored. This idea is formalized as follows.
Strategies prescribe actions. In the related theory of differential games
[16], the possible actions of a player at a particular moment are given by the
space of instantaneous control. In our case, accounting for the exogenous
uncertainty, the time-t action set of each player is defined as Ut, the set
of F t -measurable random variables, taking values in R+ almost surely. A
dynamic choice of actions {uit ∈ Ut|t ∈ [0,∞)} by player i is feasible if the
collection forms an optional process. Then, the capital stock process with
the “law of motion”
Qit = q
i
0 ∨ sup
0≤s≤t
uis, t ∈ [0,∞), (3.3)
is well defined and belongs to A (qi0).
With this concept, we can now define strategies, which are assignments
of actions for all points in time t, conditional on the information available
to the players. We begin with the definition of open loop strategies in this
framework.
3.2 Open loop equilibrium
Open loop strategies are commitments to a particular control path, indepen-
dent of the actions by any opponent during the run of the game. The reve-
lation of information regarding the exogenous uncertainty is however taken
into account. Formally, with U∞ denoting the set of F∞ -measurable random
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variables, an open loop strategy for player i is a mapping φi : [0,∞) → U∞
with φi(t) = uit ∈ Ut for all t ∈ [0,∞). The open loop strategy is feasible if
(φi(t))t≥0 belongs to A (qi0).
Here it is important to emphasize the difference between strategies and
actions. A feasible open loop strategy according to our definition φi seems
to be the same object as any feasible choice of actions {uit|t ∈ [0,∞)}. The
crucial difference lies in the interpretation. φi is a plan of actions to be taken,
valid for the entire run of the game, and fixed before the game starts. Once we
begin to consider subgames, with a deviating capital stock of the opponent,
the control given by any open loop strategy is unaffected. Generally, the
taken sequence of actions {uit|t ∈ [0,∞)} is decided upon dynamically and
depends on the evolution of the game. It is a challenge to classify strategies
that mimic such behaviour and generate well-defined outcomes.
We allow player i to optimize in the present setup against a given feasi-
ble open loop strategy φ−i used by the opponent, by solving the following
optimization problem.
max
uit∈Ut,t≥0
J(Qi, Q−i) (3.4)
s.t.
Qit = q
i
0 ∨ sup
0≤s≤t
uis ∈ A (qi0)
Q−it = q
−i
0 ∨ sup
0≤s≤t
φ−i(s)
In this problem, Q−i is a fixed given process from A (q−i0 ). Thus, if there is a
best response by player i, it can be identified by the generated capital process
Qi itself and expressed by an open loop strategy as well. Consequently, this
class is not restrictive for a best reply. An equilibrium of the game with open
loop strategies is then defined as follows.
Definition 3.1. The pair (φ1, φ2) of open loop strategies is an open loop
Nash equilibrium if for each i ∈ {1, 2} an optimal control (uit)t≥0 of the
optimization problem (3.4) exists and satisfies φi(t) = uit for all t ∈ [0,∞).
We observe that this equilibrium concept is equivalent to the open loop
case as presented in Chapter 2, apart from the right-continuity, which will
be important below. In this case all interaction is resolved at the beginning
of the game.
3.3 Markov perfect equilibrium
To allow dynamic strategic interaction, we have to enable the players to base
their investment decisions on past actions. These strategies are called closed
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loop strategies in general. Open loop strategies are degenerate closed loop
strategies in the sense that they are independent of any history of actions.
Another important subset of closed loop strategies are Markovian strategies
that are conditioned only on the current state of the game. Such strategies are
particularly appropriate if the state represents all payoff-relevant information
concerning past play (e.g. [21]). In our case the payoff functions (3.1) imply
that at any moment all payoff-relevant influence of past investment decisions
is contained in the current capital levels (Q1t , Q
2
t ).
While one could conceive of accounting for the exogenous shock X sepa-
rately1, the presentation becomes clearer if we suppose it is a Markov process
and include its current value Xt in the state. Then, we may focus on sta-
tionary strategies since the horizon is infinite.
A stationary Markovian strategy assigns an action for any possible state
(x, q1, q2) of the game, independent of time t. Formally, we define a stationary
Markovian strategy for player i as a measurable function φi : R×R2+ → R+.
Thus, player i’s action at time t given by the Markovian strategy φi is
uit = φ
i(Xt, Q
i
t, Q
−i
t ), (3.5)
an F t -measurable random variable for given (Q
i, Q−i) ∈ A (qi) × A (q−i).
Note that it is not clear at all at this point, whether there exist feasible capital
stock processes Qi, Q−i satisfying (3.5) and (3.3) for i = 1, 2 simultaneously.
On the other hand, there may also be a multitude of solutions.
This is a key issue in any continuous-time game, independent of the added
uncertainty, and will become clear in our examples. Anderson addresses the
multiplicity problem in [3], while it is not explicitly mentioned in [16]. We
propose to resolve it by the equilibrium definition, rather than by restricting
the strategy spaces. Since it depends on the particular hypothesized equi-
librium whether the outcome of the game might not be uniquely defined, it
would seem to require a very strong restriction to exclude all such cases a
priori.
We are looking for subgame perfect equilibria in Markovian strategies.
Consequently, we identify a subgame by a starting time t0 ∈ [0,∞) and an
initial state (x, q1, q2) ∈ R × R2+ only. From t0 onwards, the game evolves
according to (3.3) with (3.5) and payoffs follow (3.1) with time t = 0 shifted
to t0 and the initial state moved to (x, q
1, q2), since X is by assumption
Markovian.
Our notion of optimizing behaviour on behalf of the players is as follows.
In equilibrium, given the Markovian strategy of the opponent, player i should
not be able to increase the payoff in any subgame by any feasible control
1φi : R+×R+×[0,∞)→ U∞ with φi(qi, q−i, t) ∈ Ut for all (qi, q−i) ∈ R2+ and t ∈ [0,∞)
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path. Consider first the “subgame” starting at t0 = 0 with x ∈ R fixed and
let player i solve the following verification problem
max
uit∈Ut,t≥0
J(Qi, Q−i) (3.6)
s.t.
X0 = x
Qit = q
i ∨ sup
0≤s≤t
uis ∈ A (qi)
Q−it = q
−i ∨ sup
0≤s≤t
φ−i(Xs, Q−is , Q
i
s)
In this problem, we can identify any control {uit|t ∈ [0,∞)} satisfying the
second constraint by the generated capital process Qi itself. A feasible control
for problem (3.6) is one that satisfies all constraints and by which Q−i ∈
A (q−i) is uniquely (P-a.s.) determined. Otherwise, the value of this problem
would not be clear. The existence of feasible controls depends of course on
the particular function φ−i. A control is optimal for this problem if it is
maximal among all feasible controls.
Note that in this optimization problem, player i has the same controls
available as in the open loop problem (3.4). This is however again not a
restriction but in fact gives the player the greatest conceivable power. With
the reactions of the opponent specified by φ−i, player i can in (3.6) perfectly
control the entire evolution of the “subgame”, without having to worry how
to implement the desired outcome by a Markovian strategy. Player i can
for instance perfectly preempt the opponent in (3.6), as will be illustrated
below, without even an -margin.
Also note that because of our Markovian assumption on X and the sta-
tionarity of the strategies φi, a subgame starting at any time t0 ∈ [0,∞) is
fully characterized by its initial state (x, q1, q2). So, the verification problem
analogous to (3.6) for the subgame beginning in t0 is in fact of the same
form as (3.6) with the appropriate initial state. Then, if we allow player i to
optimize in any subgame by solving the related problem (3.6), this endows
the player also with the greatest conceivable flexibility.
Summing up, if we require for a subgame perfect equilibrium in Markov
strategies, called Markov perfect equilibrium, that each player i fares in any
subgame as well as in the related verification problem (3.6), the players could
not improve by any other closed loop strategy. The equilibrium would still
persist with richer strategy spaces.
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Definition 3.2. The pair (φ1, φ2) of Markovian strategies is a Markov perfect
equilibrium for initial capital stocks (q10, q
2
0) ∈ R2+ if for each state (x, q1, q2) ∈
R× R2+ with qi ≥ qi0 there exist a solution (Q˜1, Q˜2) ∈ A (q1)×A (q2) to
Q1t = q
1 ∨ sup
0≤s≤t
φ1(Xs, Q
1
s, Q
2
s)
Q2t = q
2 ∨ sup
0≤s≤t
φ2(Xs, Q
2
s, Q
1
s), t ∈ [0,∞)
(3.7)
where X0 = x, P-a.s., and a pair of optimal controls {u1t |t ∈ [0,∞)} and
{u2t |t ∈ [0,∞)} for problem (3.6) with initial state (x, q1, q2) yielding payoffs
J(Q˜1, Q˜2) and J(Q˜2, Q˜1), respectively.
In the equilibrium definition, we do not ask for a unique solution of the
combination of Markov strategies (3.7). But the chosen solution (Q˜1, Q˜2) has
to be optimal for both players simultaneously in the strong notion above.
None of the players has at any moment or state of the game an incentive to
employ any different control.
To identify any equilibria, we need to address the central optimization
problems (3.6). These are singular control problems, but not of the mono-
tone follower type as in the open loop case. Owing to the argument of the
Markovian strategy φ−i, there is a stronger path dependence and the methods
employed in Chapter 2 are not applicable. In particular, we cannot switch
from singular control to optimal stopping by the Fubini theorem anymore.
Now, for planning ahead, not only the capital stock at a certain future time
matters from that point onwards, but also how capital has evolved until then.
The decision to delay investment thus obtains a new aspect and we have to
take an alternative approach to account for it.
3.4 A verification theorem
We aim to establish a verification theorem for the optimization problems
(3.6). We already argued that for a given Markovian strategy φ−i and a
Markov process X, the value of the problem depends only on the initial
state (x, q1, q2) and not on the starting time, set to zero in (3.6). With our
Assumption 7, the value function
V ∗(x, qi, q−i) , sup
Qi∈A (qi)
J(Qi, Q−i) (3.8)
s.t.
X0 = x
Q−it = q
−i ∨ sup
0≤s≤t
φ−i(Xs, Q−is , Q
i
s)
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is well defined, provided φ−i is sufficiently regular such that the additional fea-
sibility constraint for the “controls” Qi to uniquely determine Q−i is satisfied.
As suggested above, we here replaced the control sequences {uit|t ∈ [0,∞)}
by the generated capital processes.
The stationarity of the value function V ∗ motivates a dynamic program-
ming approach. Specifically, it holds for anyQi ∈ A (qi0), withQ−i ∈ A (q−i0 )
generated by φ−i and any almost surely finite (F t )t≥0-stopping time τ
V ∗(X0, qi0, q
−i
0 ) ≥ E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−rtΠ(Xt, Qit, Q
−i
t ) dt−
∫ τ
0
e−rt dQit
+ V ∗(Xτ , Qiτ , Q
−i
τ )
]
.
(3.9)
Consequently, the argument of the expectation is a super-martingale for any
feasible Qi and the route is to identify such a process.
Suppose now that X is an Ito¯ process, i.e. solves the stochastic differential
equation
dXt = µt dt+ σt dBt, t ∈ [0,∞) (3.10)
with X0 = x0 ∈ R, P-a.s., for a Brownian motion B on our filtered proba-
bility space and appropriate2 drift and variance processes µ, σ. Then, for all
feasible capital stock processes (Q1, Q2) ∈ A (q1) × A (q2), the state pro-
cess is a semi-martingale, because the components Q1 and Q2 are monotone,
adapted processes, i.e. of finite variation. Consequently, we may attempt
to “construct” sufficiently smooth functions V and verify by Ito¯’s lemma
whether they coincide with the value function V ∗ in (3.8).
However, to identify a Markov perfect equilibrium, we need to solve (3.8)
for all possible states and check whether there exists a solution (Q˜1, Q˜2) to
the combination of equilibrium strategies (φ1, φ2) as formalized in Definition
3.2, which actually attains the respective value. This procedure would be
strongly simplified if we could apply the sought verification theorem somehow
to Markovian strategies directly. To facilitate such an approach, we exploit
the properties of local investment incentives following Assumption 7. They
help to identify appropriate classes of best replies, that will eventually admit
a Markovian representation as well.
Specifically, note that player i can undertake an initial discrete invest-
ment of size ξ0 > 0. Thus, V
∗(x, qi, q−i) ≥ V ∗(x, qi + ξ0, q−i) − ξ0, where
the player behaves optimally after the investment. The optimal investment
policy from state (x, qi + ξ0, q
−i) may require a further discrete investment,
then the estimate holds with equality, but the jump ξ0 may also have been
2µ and σ predictable, µ ∈ L1(P⊗ dt), σ ∈ L2(P⊗ dt)
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too large, i.e. unprofitable. Since we assumed that instantaneous marginal
revenue decreases in qi, it might be optimal for fixed x and q−i to make an
initial investment whenever qi is below a certain value, and otherwise not.
This critical value might further depend on x and q−i in the same direction
as marginal revenue, i.e. increase in x and decrease in q−i. Formally, this
hypothesis corresponds to a Markovian strategy with the properties φiqi = 0,
φix > 0, and φ
i
q−i ≤ 0 in case of differentiability. Then, the inverse
X¯ i(qi, q−i) , sup{x ∈ R| qi ≥ φi(x, qi, q−i)} (3.11)
is well defined and satisfies
X¯ iqi > 0,
X¯ iq−i ≥ 0
(3.12)
(where the set is non-empty) and
lim
qi→∞
X¯ i(qi, q−i) =∞ (q−i ∈ R+). (3.13)
Changing perspective, we can for any C1 function X¯ i : R2+ → R with the
properties (3.12) and (3.13) define a corresponding Markov strategy
φi(x, q−i) , sup{q ∈ R+|x ≥ X¯ i(q, q−i)} ∨ 0 (3.14)
with the argued properties. Here, we neglected the irrelevant argument of φi
and dominated the supremum of the empty set, −∞, by 0 for later use.
3.4.1 Reflection strategies
We will call strategies of the type (3.14) with the properties (3.12) and (3.13)
reflection strategies. They prescribe to keep the state outside the “forbidden”
region {x > X¯ i(qi, q−i)} with minimal effort, like controls in obstacle prob-
lems. Since X has almost surely continuous paths, this policy involves only
an initial discrete investment to bring the state onto the boundary of the
forbidden region if necessary. Afterwards, the mentioned continuous singular
control is exercised to reflect the state whenever X approaches the boundary
X¯ i.
Now suppose the opponent of player i uses a reflection strategy with X¯−i
satisfying (3.12) and (3.13). Our verification theorem will specify conditions
under which a particular reflection strategy X¯ i is a best reply for player i.
At this point, we face the problem that the two considered strategies might
not uniquely define the capital processes Q1 and Q2 for any initial state,
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for instance if the boundaries are functions of the sum of the capital stocks.
Thus, we have to pick a particular solution Qi to be used as control in the
verification problem (3.6), resp. (3.8). The solution we generally select is
where player i acts as the leader.
Consider first the discrete initial investments for the state (x0, q
1
0, q
2
0) ∈
R× R2+. As the leader, player i first adjusts the capital stock to
Qi0 = q
i
0 ∨ φi(x0, q−i0 ). (3.15)
Then, the opponent’s capital stock moves to
Q−i0 = q
−i
0 ∨ φ−i(x0, qi0 ∨ φi(x0, q−i0 )), (3.16)
which is well defined. Now note that with these initial investments, the state
is no longer in any of the forbidden regions, i.e.
x0 ≤ X¯ i(Qi0, Q−i0 ) ∧ X¯−i(Q−i0 , Qi0). (3.17)
The only critical step here is when player −i does invest, i.e. when
dQ−i0 > 0⇔ X¯−i(q−i0 , Qi0) < x0 = X¯ i(Qi0, q−i0 ). (3.18)
But then the investment induces X¯−i(Q−i0 , Q
i
0) = x0 and X¯
i(Qi0, Q
−i
0 ) ≥ x0
because of (3.12).
Outside the joint forbidden region, we still assume that player i acts as
the leader in the sense that if player i chooses to invest at the same boundary
X¯ i(qi, q−i) = X¯−i(q−i, qi) in a certain part of the state space, there usually is
a strict incentive for preemption. Such perfect preemption with zero margin
is feasible in problem (3.6) by the solution of the following Skorohod -type
problem.
Problem 3.3. Given i ∈ {1, 2}, two reflection boundaries X¯1 and X¯2 which
satisfy (3.12) and (3.13) and a starting state (x0, q
1
0, q
2
0) ∈ R× R2+, find two
processes Q1 ∈ A (q10) and Q2 ∈ A (q20) such that
Qi0 = q
i
0 ∨ φi(x0, q−i0 )
Q−i0 = q
−i
0 ∨ φ−i(x0, qi0 ∨ φi(x0, q−i0 ))
Xt ≤ X¯1(Q1t , Q2t ) ∧ X¯2(Q2t , Q1t ), t ∈ [0,∞)∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1{Xt≥X¯i(Qit,Q−it )}
)
dQit = 0∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1{X¯−i(Q−it ,Qit)≤Xt<X¯i(Qit,Q−it )}
)
dQ−it = 0

P-a.s. (3.19)
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The sought capital processes keep the state outside the joint forbidden
region over the entire time interval, almost surely. The investment needed to
do so is minimal, since it only occurs on the boundary.
Assume there exists a unique solution to this problem3, which will be
verified in the particular cases discussed below. Then, player i undertakes all
the investments to reflect the state from the joint forbidden region, except
where the boundary X¯ i strictly exceeds the minimum of the two. Where the
boundaries coincide, player −i’s investment is completely preempted by the
“leader” i.
Now we are in a position to state our verification theorem for reflection
strategies with assignment of a leader.
3.4.2 Verification theorem
Assume now X is a geometric Brownian motion, i.e. solves the stochastic
differential equation
dXt = µXt dt+ σXt dBt, t ∈ [0,∞)
with constant, real µ and σ. We will only consider initial values X0 = x0 ≥ 0,
so for any t ∈ [0,∞), Xt ∈ R+, P-a.s.
For the usual notation, introduce the infinitesimal generator Lx of the
process X, which applied to any C2 function f : R→ R, x 7→ f(x) yields
Lxf = µxfx + 1
2
σ2x2fxx.
In the following verification theorem, we want to identify a function V of the
state that equals the payoff from a particular solution to Problem 3.3 at the
given initial state, J(Qi, Q−i). Outside the joint forbidden region, i.e. absent
any investment, the payoff evolves like an asset whose price is a function
of X and which generates a dividend flow Π. At starting states inside the
forbidden region, player i is the leader of initial investment, bringing the
state on the boundary X¯ i, at a cost equal to the size of the jump. Only
if this still exceeds X¯−i will the opponent make an anticipated investment,
which will not affect the value of player i’s payoff.
Theorem 3.4. Let X¯1 and X¯2 satisfying (3.12) and (3.13) be given and
assume (Qi, Q−i) solve Problem 3.3 for initial state (x0, q10, q
2
0).
Suppose there exists a function V : R3+ → R, (x, qi, q−i) 7→ V (x, qi, q−i)
that is of class C1,1,1 and satisfies
lim
T→∞
E
[
e−rTV (XT , QiT , Q
−i
T )
]
= 0. (3.20)
3For the classical Skorohod problem, see [19, 25, 32].
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If
· on {x ≤ X¯ i(qi, q−i) ∧ X¯−i(q−i, qi)} : V is class C2,1,1,−rV + Π + LxV = 0
· on {x > X¯ i(qi, q−i)} : V (x, qi, q−i) = V (x, φi(x, q−i), q−i)− φi(x, q−i) + qi
· on {X¯−i(q−i, qi) < x ≤ X¯ i(qi, q−i)} : V (x, qi, q−i) = V (x, qi, φ−i(x, qi))
then V (x0, q
1
0, q
2
0) = J(Q
i, Q−i).
If furthermore
· V is class C2,1,1 on {x ≤ X¯−i(q−i, qi)}
· Vqi ≤ 1 on {x ≤ X¯ i(qi, q−i) ∧ X¯−i(q−i, qi)}
· Vq−i(X¯ i(qi, q−i), qi, q−i) ≤ 0 on {X¯ i(qi, q−i) ≤ X¯−i(q−i, qi)}
· −rV + Π + LxV ≤ 0 on {X¯ i(qi, q−i) < x ≤ X¯−i(q−i, qi)}
then V (x0, q
1
0, q
2
0) ≥ J(Qi, Q−i) for any feasible (Qi, Q−i) ∈ A (qi0)×A (q−i0 )
in (3.6) for which (3.20) holds.
V (x0, q
1
0, q
2
0) = V
∗(x0, q10, q
2
0) only if
· Vqi ≤ 1 on {x ≤ X¯ i(qi, q−i)}
· −rV + Π + LxV ≤ 0 on {x ≤ X¯−i(q−i, qi)}
Proof. Suppose there exists V satisfying the first set of sufficient conditions.
Note the frequently used equivalence
x = X¯ i(qi, q−i)⇔ qi = φi(x, q−i).
Note also that φi and φ−i are continuously differentiable in x and q−i and
qi, respectively, since X¯ i and X¯−i are. We calculate the following partial
derivatives.
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On {x > X¯ i(qi, q−i)}:
Vqi = 1 = Vqi(x, φ
i(x, q−i), q−i) (Vqi continuous)
Vq−i = ∂q−i
(
V (x, φi(x, q−i), q−i)− φi(x, q−i))
= Vq−i(x, φ
i(x, q−i), q−i)
(3.21)
To obtain the last line, we already used the first result.
On {X¯−i(q−i, qi) < x ≤ X¯ i(qi, q−i)}:
Vq−i = 0 = Vq−i(x, q
i, φ−i(x, qi)) (Vq−i continuous)
Vqi = ∂qi
(
V (x, qi, φ−i(x, qi))
)
= Vqi(x, q
i, φ−i(x, qi))
(3.22)
Again the first line implies the last.
Now consider an initial state (x0, q
1
0, q
2
0) such that X0 = x0 ≤ X¯1(q10, q20) ∧
X¯2(q20, q
1
0). Then, the paths of the semi-martingale (X,Q
1, Q2), where the
capital processes are the hypothesized solution to Problem 3.3, satisfy Xt ≤
X¯1(Q1t , Q
2
t ) ∧ X¯2(Q2t , Q1t ) for all t ∈ [0,∞) P-a.s.
Since V is class C2,1,1 on {x ≤ X¯ i(qi, q−i) ∧ X¯−i(q−i, qi)}, we can apply Ito¯’s
lemma to obtain for arbitrary T ∈ [0,∞)
e−rTV (XT , QiT , Q
−i
T )− V (X0, Qi0, Q−i0 ) =∫ T
0
e−rt
(−rV (Xt, Qit, Q−it ) + LxV (Xt, Qit, Q−it )) dt
+
∫ T
0
e−rtµXtVx(Xt, Qit, Q
−i
t ) dBt
+
∫ T
0
e−rtVqi(Xt, Q
i
t, Q
−i
t ) dQ
ic
t
+
∫ T
0
e−rtVq−i(Xt, Q
i
t, Q
−i
t ) dQ
−i
t
+
∑
t≤T
e−rt4V (Xt, Qit, Q−it ), P-a.s.,
(3.23)
where Qic is the continuous part of Qi and the sum is over the jumps of Qi
up to T . Note that the presently discussed Qi and Q−i are continuous, but
we will later allow for jumps of Qi alone.
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The second integral is a martingale, since for all (Qi, Q−i) ∈ A (qi)×A (q−i)
and T ∈ R+,
(
1{t≤T}e−rtµXtVx(Xt, Qit, Q
−i
t )
)
t≥0 ∈ L2(P ⊗ dt) by continuity
of Vx. It disappears when we now take expectations. We also rearrange and
subtract the payoff stream including investment costs up to T on both sides.
V (X0, Q
i
0, Q
−i
0 )− E
[∫ T
0
e−rtΠ(Xt, Qit, Q
−i
t ) dt−
∫ T
0
e−rt dQit
]
=
E
[
−
∫ T
0
e−rt
(−rV (Xt, Qit, Q−it ) + Π(Xt, Qit, Q−it ) + LxV (Xt, Qit, Q−it )) dt
−
∫ T
0
e−rt
(
Vqi(Xt, Q
i
t, Q
−i
t )− 1
)
dQict
−
∑
t≤T
e−rt
(4V (Xt, Qit, Q−it )−4Qit)
−
∫ T
0
e−rtVq−i(Xt, Q
i
t, Q
−i
t ) dQ
−i
t
]
+ E
[
e−rTV (XT , QiT , Q
−i
T )
]
(3.24)
All integrals and the sum on the right hand side are zero by the sufficient
conditions. dQi > 0 only if Xt ≥ X¯ i(Qit, Q−it ) and then Vqi = 1. Similarly,
dQ−i > 0 only if X¯−i(Q−it , Q
i
t) ≤ Xt < X¯ i(Qit, Q−it ) and then Vq−i = 0.
Finally, the last term goes to zero by hypothesis if we let T go to ∞, so
V (x0, q
i
0, q
−i
0 )− J(Qi, Q−i) = 0, (3.25)
since there was no initial jump. However, for initial states (x0, q
1
0, q
2
0) inside
the forbidden region, the equality still holds since the jumps occur while
Vqi = 1 and Vq−i = 0.
For the next claim, consider the additional set of sufficient conditions. Note
that for any Qi ∈ A (qi0), Q−i given by φ−i solves the Skorohod problem
Xt ≤ X¯−i(Q−it , Qit), t ∈ [0,∞)∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1{Xt≥X¯−i(Q−it ,Qit)}
)
dQ−it = 0,
(3.26)
P-a.s., since no jump of Qi can move the state into −i’s forbidden region,
see (3.12). Thus, it is sufficient that V is class C2,1,1 on {x ≤ X¯−i(q−i, qi)} to
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apply Ito¯’s lemma on that region. Equation (3.24) remains valid for arbitrary
Qi ∈ A (qi0) after the initial jumps, where X0 ≤ X¯−i(Q−i0 , Qi0) follows for all
dQi0.
The second given condition implies that Vqi ≤ 1 on R3+, since in the region
{X¯−i(q−i, qi) < x ≤ X¯ i(qi, q−i)} it is evaluated at the lower boundary, see
(3.22).
The third condition similarly implies Vq−i ≤ 0 on {x ≥ X¯−i(q−i, qi)} (the
only region where dQ−i can be strictly positive), since on {x ≥ X¯ i(qi, q−i)},
Vq−i it is evaluated at the boundary, see (3.21).
The last condition implies −rV + Π + LxV ≤ 0 on {x ≤ X¯−i(q−i, qi)}, to
which the state is constrained after initial jumps.
Together, the conditions imply that the integrals and sum on the right hand
side of (3.24) are nonnegative. Letting again T go to ∞, we obtain
V (x0, q
i
0, q
−i
0 )− J(Qi, Q−i) ≥ 0. (3.27)
A similar remark regarding initial states inside the forbidden region applies
and we conclude that there is no feasible capital stock process for player i
with a payoff dominating V .
Now suppose the first necessary condition is violated, i.e. there exists a state
such that x < X¯ i(qi, q−i), where the strategy prescribes no investment, but
where Vqi > 1. Then, by continuity of the derivative, there exists  > 0
such that Vqi(x, q, q
−i) > 1 for all q ∈ [qi, qi + ]. Then, the payoff from an
-investment, followed by pursuing the given reflection strategy, is V (x, qi +
, q−i)−  > V (x, qi, q−i).
Similarly, if the second necessary condition is violated, there exists a state
x ≤ X¯−i(q−i, qi) where −rV + Π + LxV > 0, which can only happen where
X¯−i(q−i, qi) < X¯ i(qi, q−i). Since V there is twice continuously differentiable
in x, there exists  > 0 such that −rV + Π + LxV > 0 for all x′ ∈ [x− , x].
Then, for all initial states (x′, qi, q−i), the capital process (qi ∨ 1{t≥τ}Qi),
where τ = inf{t ≥ 0|Xt 6∈ (x − , x)} yields a higher payoff then Qi by the
Ito¯-formula, since dQ−i = 0 before τ.
o.e.d.
The sufficient conditions given in the verification theorem are quite con-
structive. For a given pair of reflection strategies, resp. boundaries X¯1 and
X¯2, we can try to construct the associated V , by solving the partial dif-
ferential equation, subject to the constraint that the extension to the other
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regions happens in a differentiable way. If the optimality conditions are sat-
isfied, the verification problems (3.6) are solved for all initial states for which
the Skorohod Problem 3.3 with X¯1 and X¯2 has a unique solution. This comes
very close to our equilibrium definition and enables us to determine Markov
perfect equilibria quite systematically in the following.
3.5 Bertrand equilibrium
The example that we discuss from now on is the revenue specification of
Grenadier [22]. Suppose, the firms produce a homogeneous good at full
capacity and sell it on a common market, facing inverse demand with constant
elasticity. The price is multiplicatively affected by the exogenous shock X,
our geometric Brownian motion defined above. With zero variable cost, the
revenue function for firm i is then
Π(x, qi, q−i) = xP (qi + q−i)qi = x(qi + q−i)−
1
α qi. (3.28)
Assume α > 1 to conform to Assumption 7. Regarding the integrability
requirement, we anticipate a result of the subsequent section, where we will
see that the monopolist’s optimal payoff is finite iff α < β. The latter is a
function of the remaining parameters and will be presented soon. The ex-
pected revenue of any player in the game is now nonnegative and dominated
by that of the monopolist, since competitive output can only decrease the
price.
In this section, we begin with a simple type of reflection strategies, where
a firm invests whenever the price XtP (Q
i
t+Q
−i
t ) rises above a certain constant
threshold. Such policies will lead to the most commonly conjectured closed
loop equilibrium, Bertrand quantities. Its elaboration is useful to illustrate
some concepts and to derive some general results employed in the following,
more involved cases.
Consequently, assume player i’s opponent uses such a fixed price level to
trigger investment, i.e.
X¯−i(q−i, qi) =
p−i
P (qi + q−i)
(3.29)
with p−i ∈ R+. From player i’s point of view this means that independently
of Qi ∈ A (qi0), the price XtP (Qit +Q−it ) will never exceed p−i for any t > 0.
If i does not invest, the price will be reflected at this barrier. The problem
is now how to preempt the opponent optimally, if at all.
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Whenever player i invests, the additional net revenue is of course coun-
tered by the externality of lowering the price for existing output, as al-
ways in Cournot competition. This becomes obvious in marginal revenue
x
(
P (qi + q−i) + qiP ′(qi + q−i)
)
, where the derivative is negative.
In the cases of monopoly, oligopoly with open loop strategies, and perfect
competition, the optimal investment strategies can be determined by deciding
when to install marginal capital units in order to start the associated marginal
revenue flow. For each unit, there is an option to delay investment and the
optimal exercise time can be determined independently by optimal stopping.
In particular we showed in Chapter 2 that the value of the option to delay
marginal investment is closely related to the opportunity cost.
In the present case, player i’s investment also influences the capital stock
of the opponent and due to the running suprema in (3.6), resp. (3.8), some
path-dependence arises and we cannot treat the marginal capital units inde-
pendently, anymore. The opportunity cost principle is now only applicable
subject to full preemption (when Q−i ≡ q−i0 ), respectively over intervals
in which the opponent’s investment boundary is not reached. This will be
illustrated below.
We begin the study of our present example with the question when it is
profitable for player i to cause the price reflection by own investment. In fact,
since the price barrier here is constant, the decision will always be the same
whenever the boundary is reached. Thus, we aim to determine the values of
always preempting, as well as never investing, with the help of Theorem 3.4.
First, we can solve the partial differential equation which V has to satisfy
off the forbidden region. The general solution is polynomial.
V (x, qi, q−i) = A(qi, q−i)x+B(qi, q−i)xβ (3.30)
Here, β is the positive root of the typical quadratic equation4 and given by
β =
−(µ− 1
2
σ2) +
√
(µ− 1
2
σ2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
. (3.31)
Note that β > 1 ⇔ r > µ, which is necessary for our assumption β > α to
hold.
Furthermore must the first coefficient satisfy
A(qi, q−i) =
1
r − µP (q
i + q−i)qi. (3.32)
4We neglected the corresponding negative root as further exponent in V , which would
otherwise diverge to positive or negative infinity when x approaches zero.
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As a consequence, the first term of V is necessarily equal to the net present
value of the revenue flow, were the current capacities fixed forever. This
observation holds independently of the considered boundaries X¯1 and X¯2.
The latter come into play by the boundary conditions for the partial
derivatives of V in Theorem 3.4. We have to match the coefficient function
B to X¯1 and X¯2 by these boundary conditions.
Begin in the current example with the case of never investing, i.e. X¯ i ≡ ∞.
So, since X¯ i(qi, q−i) > X¯−i(q−i, qi), V must satisfy (cf. (3.22))
Vq−i(
p−i
P (qi + q−i)
, qi, q−i) = 0
⇔ Bq−i =− Aq−i(p−i)1−βP (qi + q−i)β−1
=
(p−i)1−β
α(r − µ)q
i(qi + q−i)−
β
α
−1.
(3.33)
The last expression can be integrated to obtain
B(qi, q−i) = − (p
−i)1−β
β(r − µ)q
i(qi + q−i)−
β
α + C(qi)
= − p
−i
β(r − µ)q
i
(
P (qi + q−i)
p−i
)β
+ C(qi).
(3.34)
Using this coefficient B, we can define by
V ∞(x, qi, q−i) , p
−i
r − µq
ixP (q
i + q−i ∨ φ−i(x, qi))
p−i
− p
−i
β(r − µ)q
i
(
xP (qi + q−i ∨ φ−i(x, qi))
p−i
)β (3.35)
a function satisfying the first set of sufficient conditions and hypothesis of
Theorem 3.4. The latter is true because the prices xP here are bounded
above by p−i and xVx is of the same order as V . The corresponding solutions
to Problem 3.3 are
Qi ≡ qi0 and Q−i = q−i0 ∨
(
sup
0≤s≤t
(Xs/p
−i)α − qi0
)
t≥0
.
The integration constant C(qi) has been set to zero, since V ∞ represents
the net present value of selling the constant output flow qi at a diffusion price,
reflected at the barrier p−i, which cannot indefinitely increase nor decrease
in the initial shock value x. Also note that generally any constant coefficient
component
C · xβ
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of V will drop out when we apply Ito¯’s lemma in (3.23).
Now consider the other case and let
X¯ i =
p−i
P (qi + q−i)
,
i.e. player i preempts the investment of −i at the identical boundary by
implementing the capital stock process
Qi = qi0 ∨
(
sup
0≤s≤t
(Xs/p
−i)α − q−i0
)
t≥0
so that Q−i ≡ q−i0 , which together again solve Problem 3.3.
Then, since X¯ i(qi, q−i) ≤ X¯−i(q−i, qi), the relevant boundary condition
for V is (cf. (3.21))
Vqi(
p−i
P (qi + q−i)
, qi, q−i) = 1
⇔ Bqi = −(p−i)−β
(
qi
(
p−i(α−1)
(r−µ)α − 1
)
+ q−i
(
p−i
r−µ − 1
))
(qi + q−i)−
β
α
−1.
This is again one of the rare cases in which one can explicitly integrate for B.
Neglecting the integration constant for the same reason as before, we arrive
at
Bp
−i
(qi, q−i)(
P (qi + q−i)
)β = αβ−α(p−i)−β(qi(p−i(α−1)(r−µ)α − 1)+ q−i(p−i(β−1)(r−µ)β − 1)).
With this particular coefficient function, the value of preempting at p−i from
a given initial state is completely determined by5
V p
−i
(x, qi, q−i) ,
{
A(qi, q−i)x+Bp
−i
(qi, q−i)xβ if x ≤ p−i/P (qi + q−i)
V p
−i
(x, φi(x, q−i), q−i)− φi(x, q−i) + qi else.
Now we can compare the values of both policies. Preempting is more
profitable than never investing iff V p
−i ≥ V ∞. On {qi ≥ φi(x, q−i)} this is
equivalent to
α
β−α
(
qi
(
p−i(α−1)
(r−µ)α − 1
)
+ q−i
(
p−i(β−1)
(r−µ)β − 1
))
+ qi p
−i
β(r−µ) ≥ 0
⇔
(
p−i(β−1)
(r−µ)β − 1
)(
α
β−αq
i + q−i
)
≥ 0
5At the price boundary, V p
−i
is linear in qi. We clarify below that the boundedness
condition is satisfied.
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⇔ p−i ≥ β(r − µ)
(β − 1) , p
∗.
Then, V p
−i ≥ V ∞ also on {qi < φi(x, q−i)}, since in this region, V p−i
qi
= 1 ≤
V ∞qi = p
−i/p∗.
p∗ is a quite important quantity, it is precisely the Bertrand price, which
we know from the case of perfect competition. If the price is reflected at this
barrier, the net present value of a marginal capital unit equals one at the
boundary, its cost. Consequently, the option to delay investment is valueless.
In principle, we already know now that in the only Markov perfect equi-
librium with a constant reflection price both players invest at the Bertrand
price, where each is just indifferent. However, we want to formally prove this
finding by completing the consistent application of Theorem 3.4 and checking
our equilibrium definition.
Specifically, we have only determined when preemption at p−i is superior
to remaining passive. For optimality, we need to verify the further sufficient
conditions.
In particular, for concluding that our candidate function V is really the
value function defined in (3.8), we need to verify that it satisfies the bound-
edness condition for all relevant controls. This first problem can be easily
tackled because the expected revenue from any capital process is finite by
assumption and we only need to consider processes with finite investment
cost. In this case integration by parts yields
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt dQt
]
<∞⇒ lim
T→∞
E
[
e−rTQT
]
= 0 (3.36)
and it suffices to establish a linear bound on V for arbitrary capital processes.
Then,
Lemma 3.5. For any Qi ∈ A (qi) with finite investment cost and q−i ∈ R+,
lim
T→∞
E
[
e−rTV p
−i
(XT , Q
i
T , q
−i)
]
= 0.
The investment cost of reflecting the price at any constant barrier is finite.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
By Lemma 3.5, we may now check the second set of sufficient conditions
in Theorem 3.4 to verify when either strategy is optimal6 in (3.6).
6One could also restrict the search to the class of processes never exceeding the Bertrand
quantity. Lemma 3.11 in the Appendix states that such a cap is profitable and is proven
by the optimal stopping approach of Chapter 2.
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Let us again begin with X¯ i ≡ ∞. All but the second sufficient condition
hold by construction. Since V ∞qi is increasing in x, the condition is satisfied
iff
V ∞qi (
p−i
P (qi + q−i)
, qi, q−i) ≤ 1
⇔ p
−i
(r − µ)
(β − 1)
β
≤ 1
⇔ p−i ≤ p∗.
(3.37)
We may as expected conclude that at any constant reflection barrier lower
than Bertrand it is optimal for player i to abstain from investment.
The corresponding condition for X¯ i = p−i/P (qi + q−i) can be verified by
an important general result. For this, note that whenever X¯ i ≤ X¯−i, the
coefficient function B needs to satisfy the boundary condition
Vqi(X¯
i(qi, q−i), qi, q−i) = 1
⇔ Bqi =
(
1− AqiX¯ i(qi, q−i)
)
X¯ i(qi, q−i)−β.
(3.38)
We want to answer the question in which cases the necessary optimality
condition for Vqi is compatible with (3.38).
Vqi ≤ 1, ∀x ∈ [0, X¯ i(qi, q−i)]
⇔Bqi ≤ (1− Aqix)x−β, ∀x ∈ [0, X¯ i(qi, q−i)]
(3.39)
The last condition can only hold if the right hand side is not increasing in
x (in the given interval), since equality is attained at the upper bound by
(3.38). It is nonincreasing iff
x ≤ β
β − 1
(
Aqi
)−1
= p∗
qi + q−i
α−1
α
qi + q−i
(
P (qi + q−i)
)−1 , p¯(qi, q−i)
P (qi + q−i)
. (3.40)
Thus, when X¯ i ≤ X¯−i, it satisfies the optimality condition if and only if
X¯ i ≤ p¯(qi, q−i)/P (qi+q−i). The latter function is not only important because
of this property, it also happens to be the myopic price trigger discussed in
detail below. For future reference note also
X¯ i ≤ p¯(q
i, q−i)
P (qi + q−i)
⇔ Vqix(X¯ i, qi, q−i) ≥ 0. (3.41)
Concerning the present example, we thus only have to verify whether
p−i ≤ p¯(qi, q−i), which is satisfied iff
qi ≥ q−i p
−i − p∗
p∗ − α−1
α
p−i
≥ 0. (3.42)
64
Both inequalities must hold, so if p−i ≥ p∗ ·α/(α−1), it cannot be the optimal
boundary (which will be lower). Furthermore, we also consider subgames off
the equilibrium path — at least with capital stocks not strictly below the
initial levels —, so (3.42) has to be satisfied by all qi ≥ qi0 and q−i ≥ q−i0 , and
does so only if p−i ≤ p∗.
It remains to check under which conditions V p
−i
q−i ≤ 0 at the investment
boundary. A short calculation shows
V p
−i
q−i (x, φ
i(x, q−i), q−i) =
x
p−i
(
1− p−i
p∗
)
P (qi + q−i) ≤ 0⇔ p−i ≥ p∗.
Consequently, preempting at the fixed price level is optimal in all subgames
iff7 p−i = p∗, i.e. when both players are just indifferent to invest at the
boundary.
In fact, if both players use X¯ i = p∗/P (qi + q−i), we can select any pair of
processes (Q1, Q2) ∈ A (q10) × A (q20) that jointly reflect the price at p∗ to
comply with our equilibrium Definition 3.2. Let us summarize this result.
Proposition 3.6. For all initial capital levels (q10, q
2
0) ∈ R2+, the pair of
Markovian strategies (φB, φB), where
φB(x, q) ,
(
x
p∗
)α
− q,
is a Markov perfect equilibrium for the game with revenue function (3.28).
The equilibrium value of firm i at state (x, qi, q−i) ∈ R3+ is given by the
function
V B(x, qi, q−i) ,
q
i if xP (qi + q−i) ≥ p∗,
β
β−1q
i xP (q
i+q−i)
p∗ − 1β−1qi
(
xP (qi+q−i)
p∗
)β
else.
We observe that the value of each firm equals its current capital stock
in the forbidden region. The additional revenue flow from any investment
in this region has present value one, identical to its cost, and thus does
not affect firm value. Consequently, the option value of waiting completely
disappears. Any profitable investment is immediately exploited, like under
perfect competition.
7We did not prove that V p
−i
q−i ≤ 0 is necessary, but we showed V∞ > V p
−i ⇔ p−i < p∗.
65
3.6 Myopic investment
We saw in the previous section that it might not be an optimal reply to wait
until the price reaches the opponent’s investment boundary. In this section
we will take a look at earlier investment and elaborate on the associated
optimality conditions. The results will have important implications for the
existence of further equilibria.
3.6.1 The myopic investor
For concreteness, begin with the assumption that player i’s opponent uses
the “reflection” strategy X−i ≡ ∞, which was shown to be optimal when
the price never exceeds p∗. In this case, player i can act like a monopolist,
taking the fixed competitive output as given, so the optimal strategy is not
very difficult to determine. Nevertheless, the situation is of intrinsic interest,
since we showed in Chapter 2 that the best reply to the current, fixed capital
levels is the optimal investment policy in any open loop equilibrium under
very general conditions. Such investment behaviour is called myopic and
was already discussed by Leahy in his derivation of a perfectly competitive
equilibrium [27]. The principle is widely known since then and we would like
to know which role it is playing in our setting.
Let us try to identify an optimal myopic reflection boundary Xm(qi, q−i)
with the help of Theorem 3.4, by constructing the myopic value function V m.
From the previous section, we know that necessarily on {x ≤ Xm(qi, q−i)}
V m(x, qi, q−i) =
1
r − µq
ixP (qi + q−i) +Bm(qi, q−i)xβ,
where we have to determine Bm by the boundary conditions. Furthermore,
we know from (3.41) that the necessary optimality conditions can only hold
if X¯m ≤ p¯(qi, q−i)/P (qi + q−i).
Now consider the second necessary condition of the theorem for optimal-
ity, which we only need to check for {X¯ i(qi, q−i) < x ≤ X¯−i(q−i, qi)}, since it
will hold by construction at smaller x. The notation is kept general for the
moment since the intended result is, too.
In the given region, V (x, qi, q−i) = V (x, φi(x, q−i), q−i) − φi(x, q−i) + qi.
This implies for the first partial derivative required to evaluate LxV :
Vx(x, q
i, q−i) =∂x
(
V (x, φi(x, q−i), q−i)− φi(x, q−i))
=Vx(x, φ
i(x, q−i), q−i),
(3.43)
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where the last line follows from (3.21). Differentiating once more yields
Vxx(x, q
i, q−i) =∂x
(
Vx(x, φ
i(x, q−i), q−i)
)
=Vxx(x, φ
i(x, q−i), q−i) + Vxqi(x, φ
i(x, q−i), q−i)φix(x, q
−i).
(3.44)
By these formulae, V ,Vx, and Vxx in the given region are — apart from
some correction terms — all evaluated at (x, φi(x, q−i), q−i), i.e. at an argu-
ment for which the partial differential equation is satisfied by construction.
This observation admits the following simplification on {X¯ i(qi, q−i) < x ≤
X¯−i(q−i, qi)}:
−rV + Π + LxV =rφi(x, q−i)− rqi
+Π(x, qi, q−i)− Π(x, φi(x, q−i), q−i)
+
1
2
σ2x2Vxqi(x, φ
i(x, q−i), q−i)φix(x, q
−i).
(3.45)
Then, if qi approaches φi(x, q−i), the only term on the right hand side that
remains is the last. Since φix > 0 (corresponding to X¯
i
qi > 0 and necessary for
a well defined reflection strategy), we conclude that the necessary optimality
condition can only be satisfied if
Vxqi(x, φ
i(x, q−i), q−i) ≤ 0. (3.46)
Combined with the first necessary condition (3.41), we must have equality.
Equivalently, the optimal myopic investment boundary8 is completely deter-
mined by
X¯m(qi, q−i) =
p¯(qi, q−i)
P (qi + q−i)
, (3.47)
as claimed in the previous section. Requiring Vxqi = 0 at the investment
boundary is actually the “smooth pasting condition” which is often treated
like an abstract, universal optimality condition.
As the general conclusion, whenever player i considers to invest strictly
before the opponent, at a boundary admitting a sufficiently smooth and
bounded V , it must happen at the myopic boundary, and this is the only
boundary at which we will encounter smooth pasting.
Continuing with the particular case X¯−i ≡ ∞ and X¯ i = X¯m, we still need
to verify for optimality that (3.45) is nonpositive in the entire given region,
not only near the boundary. But this follows in fact from the equivalence
∂qi
(
Π(x, qi, q−i)− rqi) ≥ 0 (3.48)
8It is indeed a proper reflection boundary with X¯mqi > 0 and limqi→∞ X¯
m =∞.
67
⇔ x ≥ r(P (qi + q−i) + qiP ′(qi + q−i))−1 = r
p∗
X¯m,
which holds on {x ≥ X¯m} since our assumption r > µ implies r < p∗. The
only sufficient condition for optimality left unanswered is the third item,
which is however irrelevant since dQ−i ≡ 0.
While the necessary conditions have already fixed Xm and simultaneously
ensure that the associated value function will satisfy all sufficient conditions,
we need of course the coefficient Bm to see that such V m indeed exists, and
to check the boundedness condition for V m in the theorem’s hypothesis.
Unfortunately, though the present case seems even simpler because i acts
like a monopolist, it is not possible to integrate explicitly for Bm as in the
previous section. As in later instances, we have to cope with its definition
via an integral.
The determining boundary condition (3.21) simplifies in this case to
Bmqi (q
i, q−i) = − 1
β−1
(
X¯m(qi, q−i)
)−β
= − 1
β−1(p
∗)−β
(
P (qi + q−i) + qiP ′(qi + q−i)
)β
= − 1
β−1(p
∗)−β
(
α−1
α
qi + q−i
)β(
qi + q−i
)− β
α
−β
.
(3.49)
Based on this partial derivative, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.7. Let X¯ i = X¯m given by (3.47), X¯−i = ∞, and define
φm(x, q−i) , sup{q ∈ R+|x ≥ X¯m(q, q−i)} ∨ 0. Then, for any (x, qi, q−i) ∈
R3+,
V m(x, qi, q−i) ,
{
β
β−1q
i xP (q
i+q−i)
p∗ +B
m(qi, q−i)xβ if x ≤ X¯m(qi, q−i)
V m(x, φm(x, q−i), q−i)− φm(x, q−i) + qi else,
with
Bm(qi, q−i) , −
∫ ∞
qi
Bmqi (q, q
−i) dq
satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 3.4.
Qit = q
i ∨ sup0≤s≤t φm(Xs, q−i) is optimal for any (x, qi, q−i) ∈ R3+ in
problem (3.6) with φ−i ≡ 0.
Proof. Concerning the boundedness condition for arbitrary Qi ∈ A (qi) with
finite cost, one can repeat the proof of Lemma 3.5 with the following esti-
mates:
xP (qi ∨ φm + q−i)
p∗
≤ p¯(q
i ∨ φm, q−i)
p∗
≤ α
α− 1
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and
−Bmqi ≤
1
β − 1(p
∗)−β
(
P (qi + q−i)
)β
⇒ 0 ≤ Bm(qi ∨ φm, q−i)xβ ≤ α
β − α
1
β − 1
(
qi ∨ φm + q−i)( α
α− 1
)β
.
o.e.d.
Bm actually can be calculated explicitly in the special case q−i = 0, true
monopoly. Then,
V m(x, qi, 0) =
q
i + β
(α−1)(β−α)
(
α−1
α
x
p∗
)α
if x > X¯m(qi, 0)
β
β−1q
i xP (q
i)
p∗ +
1
β−1
α
β−αq
i
(
α−1
α
)β(
xP (qi)
p∗
)β
else,
which is well defined and finite for α < β as claimed before.
3.6.2 Playing against a myopic investor
In the preceding, we identified the central importance of the myopic invest-
ment boundary in any potential equilibrium with two differing reflection
strategies, so the natural next step to take is the complementary point of
view. Which reflection strategies can be best replies to a myopically invest-
ing firm? Thus, suppose the opponent of player i uses the myopic boundary
in part of the state space, X¯−i = X¯m, and this is indeed strictly smaller than
X¯ i.
Then, the relevant boundary condition to construct player i’s value func-
tion V is
Vq−i(
p¯(q−i, qi)
P (qi + q−i)
, qi, q−i) = 0
⇔ Bq−i(qi, q−i) = βα(β−1)(p∗)−βqi
(
qi + q−i
)− β
α
−β(
qi + α−1
α
q−i
)β−1
, Btmq−i(qi, q−i).
(3.50)
We denote the right hand side by Btmq−i , since player i tolerates myopic in-
vestment at these points.
If we are able to determine the coefficient B from the preceding equation,
the necessary optimality condition is
Vqi(
p¯(q−i, qi)
P (qi + q−i)
, qi, q−i) ≤ 1
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⇔ Bqi(qi, q−i) ≤ 1α(β−1)(p∗)−β
(
qi + q−i
)− β
α
−β(
qi + α−1
α
q−i
)β−1·
· ((β − α)qi − (β + α− 1)q−i)
,Bpm
qi
(qi, q−i).
(3.51)
If equality holds, this is the relevant boundary condition if player i preempts
the opponent’s myopic investment.
In fact, if player i considered that it might only be optimal in part of the
state space not to intervene when the opponent invests at X¯−i, the transition
to the preemption regime has to occur continuously for a proper reflection
strategy. At those points, equality must hold in (3.51).
Since the myopic boundary is strictly increasing in the first argument, the
preempting decision for player i with qi fixed is likely to be monotone in q−i.
The smaller the latter, the smaller is the expected return from a preemption
investment. On the other hand, we saw that player i optimally has to invest
no later than at the own myopic boundary. From p¯(qi, q−i) ≤ p¯(q−i, qi) ⇔
qi ≤ q−i it is clear that player i can only await and tolerate the opponent’s
investment when having a higher capital stock. Consequently, suppose there
exists
q¯(qi) , inf{q ∈ R+|X¯ i(qi, q) ≤ p¯(q, qi)/P (q + qi)} ≤ qi.
The corresponding V can only be continuously differentiable at the transition
if Bqi(q
i, q¯(qi)) = Bpm
qi
(qi, q¯(qi)). This enables us to consider the optimality
condition (3.51), although we only know the partial derivative Btmq−i for q
−i <
q¯(qi).
With
Bqi(q
i, q−i) = Bpm
qi
(qi, q¯(qi))−
∫ q¯(qi)
q−i
Btmqiq−i(q
i, q) dq,
and
Bpm
qi
(qi, q−i) = Bpm
qi
(qi, q¯(qi))−
∫ q¯(qi)
q−i
Bpm
qiq−i(q
i, q) dq,
(3.51) is on {q−i < q¯(qi)} equivalent to∫ q¯(qi)
q−i
Bpm
qiq−i(q
i, q) dq ≤
∫ q¯(qi)
q−i
Btmqiq−i(q
i, q) dq.
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One can show9 that the relation between the two integrands is very clear cut,
Bpm
qiq−i(q
i, q−i) ≤ Btmqiq−i(qi, q−i)⇔
qi
q−i
≥
(
1
2
+
√
1
4
+
α− 1
α
)
, D > 1.
This implies that if q¯(qi) really is the upper boundary of an interval for q−i, in
which X¯ i(qi, q−i) > X¯m(q−i, qi), this can only be optimal if q¯(qi) ≤ D−1 · qi.
Put differently, not preempting the myopic investor can only be optimal for
player i on {qi ≥ D · q−i}, when having sufficiently more capital than the
opponent.
By a similar argument, we can derive a complementary condition for op-
timally preempting a myopic investor. In a preemption region, the boundary
condition for V is equality in (3.51), i.e.
Bqi(q
i, q−i) = Bpm
qi
(qi, q−i).
Correspondingly, (3.50) turns into the (sufficient) optimality condition
Bq−i(q
i, q−i) ≤ Btmq−i(qi, q−i). (3.52)
We know that player i optimally invests at the own myopic boundary if
this is below the opponent’s, i.e. whenever qi ≤ q−i. So suppose that for
given q−i, player i stops preempting the opponent at
qˆ(q−i) , inf{q ∈ R+|X¯ i(q, q−i) > p¯(q−i, q)/P (q + q−i)} ≥ q−i,
and becomes passive. Analogous to the above, (3.52) is then equivalent to∫ qˆ(q−i)
qi
Btmq−iqi(q, q
−i) dq ≤
∫ qˆ(q−i)
qi
Bpm
q−iqi(q, q
−i) dq
on {qi < qˆ(q−i)}. It can only be satisfied if qˆ(q−i) ≤ D · q−i, respectively on
{qi ≤ D · q−i}, when player i’s capital is not too much larger.
9
Btmq−iqi =
β
α2(β − 1)(p
∗)−β
(
qi + q−i
)− βα−β−1(qi + α− 1
α
q−i
)β−2
·
(
−β(qi)2 + (β/α+ α− 1)qiq−i + (α− 1)(q−i)2)
Bpmqiq−i =
β
α2(β − 1)(p
∗)−β
(
qi + q−i
)− βα−β−1(qi + α− 1
α
q−i
)β−2
·
(
−(2β − 1)(qi)2 + (β/α+ α+ β − 2)qiq−i + (α− 1)(β + α− 1)
α
(q−i)2
)
Btmq−iqi ≥Bpmqiq−i ⇔ (qi)2 − qiq−i −
α− 1
α
(q−i)2 ≥ 0
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3.6.3 Equilibrium failure
In Chapter 2 on open loop strategies, we observed that in any equilibrium the
investment behaviour is as follows. The smaller firm invests myopically until
having caught up to the other firm. If jumps occur, either only the smaller
firm jumps to a capital level not exceeding the opponent’s, or both jump
to the same level of mutual best myopic replies. We will now determine
Markovian strategies that generate exactly these capital processes in any
subgame.
In the previous section, we have already exploited the fact that the smaller
firm’s myopic investment boundary is strictly lower than the larger firm’s,
p¯(qi, q−i) ≤ p¯(q−i, qi)⇔ qi ≤ q−i. But X¯mq−i ≥ 0 iff α · q−i ≥ qi, so we have to
adjust the strategies to ensure that the initial jumps are clearly resolved as
in Subsection 3.4.1. Therefore, note that the symmetric myopic capital level
is well defined by
qs(x) , sup{q ∈ R+|x ≥ p¯(q, q)
P (2q)
} ∨ 0, (3.53)
since p¯(q, q)/P (2q) is strictly increasing in q. Whenever there is a simulta-
neous jump, both firms have to settle at this value. The appropriate myopic
Markov strategies are then given by
φ˜m(x, q−i) , φm(x, q−i ∨ qs(x)) = φm(x, q−i) ∧ qs(x) (3.54)
and have the required properties φ˜mq−i ≤ 0 and φ˜mx > 0 for all (x, q−i) ∈ R2+.
In fact, if both players use these strategies, there is a unique solution to the
state equation. For any initial state (x0, q
1
0, q
2
0) ∈ R3+, Qi0 = qi0∨ φ˜m(x0, q−i0 ) is
uniquely determined for both players, independent of assigning a leader. The
state is then outside the forbidden region, Qi0 ≥ φ˜m(x0, Q−i0 ), while no player
jumped across qs(x0). However, Q
1
0 ∨ Q20 ≥ qs(x0), and either the smaller
firm now expands using the myopic signal φm, or both are equally sized and
simultaneously track qs(x).
In order to construct a smooth function V˜ m when both players use φ˜m,
we again have to find the coefficient B˜m which ensures that all boundary
conditions are satisfied. For this, we have to distinguish the regimes in which
player i’s capital stock is smaller or larger than the opponent’s.
Begin with qi ≤ q−i. Then, player i invests at the myopic boundary and
the related boundary condition is the same as (3.49). Thus, on {0 ≤ qi ≤
q−i},
B˜m(qi, q−i) = B˜m(q−i, q−i)−
∫ q−i
qi
Bmqi (q, q
−i) dq. (3.55)
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This implies for the partial derivatives at the regime boundary
∂−
qi
B˜m(q, q) = Bmqi (q, q) and
∂+
q−iB˜
m(q, q) = ∂qB˜
m(q, q)−Bmqi (q, q).
(3.56)
Now consider the other regime, when i tolerates the myopic investment by
the opponent. The related boundary condition here is the same as (3.50).
Thus, on {0 ≤ q−i < qi},
B˜m(qi, q−i) = B˜m(qi, qi)−
∫ qi
q−i
Btmq−i(q
i, q) dq. (3.57)
This implies similarly for the partial derivatives at the regime boundary
∂−
q−iB˜
m(q, q) = Btmq−i(q, q) and
∂+
qi
B˜m(q, q) = ∂qB˜
m(q, q)−Btmq−i(q, q).
(3.58)
Compare (3.56) and (3.58). For B˜m to be continuously differentiable, we
must have
∂qB˜
m(q, q) = Bmqi (q, q) +B
tm
q−i(q, q).
This equation in one variable can be integrated to find that
B˜m(q, q) = − 1
β − 1(p
∗)−βq−
β
α
+12−
β
α
−β
(β + 1− 2α
β − α
)(2α− 1
α
)β−1
, (3.59)
which together with (3.55) and (3.57) determines B˜m on all of R2+. Now,
V˜ m(x, qi, q−i) , (3.60)
β
β − 1q
ixP (q
i + q−i)
p∗
+ B˜m(qi, q−i)xβ if
{
qi ≥ φ˜m(x, q−i)
q−i ≥ φ˜m(x, qi)
V˜ m(x, φ˜m(x, q−i), q−i)− φ˜m(x, q−i) + qi if
{
qi < φ˜m(x, q−i)
q−i ≥ φ˜m(x, qi)
V˜ m(x, qi, φ˜m(x, qi)) if
{
qi ≥ φ˜m(x, q−i)
q−i < φ˜m(x, qi)
V˜ m(x, qs(x), qs(x))− qs(x) + qi if
{
qi < φ˜m(x, q−i)
q−i < φ˜m(x, qi)
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satisfies the first set of sufficient conditions in Theorem 3.4. Note that in
particular, because we have matched (3.56) and (3.58),
V˜ mqi (
p¯(q, q)
P (2q)
, q, q) = 1
V˜ mq−i(
p¯(q, q)
P (2q)
, q, q) = 0
(3.61)
when simultaneous investment occurs.
Proposition 3.8. Define X˜m(qi, q−i) , sup{x ∈ R|qi ≥ φ˜m(x, q−i)} and let
(Q1, Q2) be the solution of Problem 3.3 if X¯1 = X¯2 = X˜m, with initial state
(x0, q
1
0, q
2
0) ∈ R3+. Then,
V˜ m(x0, q
i
0, q
−i
0 ) = J(Q
i, Q−i).
Yet, (φ˜m, φ˜m) are not a Markov perfect equilibrium.
V˜ m satisfies the hypothesis of Theorem 3.4 by a very similar argument as
in the proof of Proposition 3.7. However, V˜ m does not satisfy the necessary
conditions for optimality, because the strategies allow the smaller opponent
to catch up gradually. We saw in the previous subsection that this cannot be
optimal on {qi < D · q−i}, with D strictly greater than one. Once the capital
levels are within this distance, tolerating further investment is suboptimal.
Consequently, the Markovian strategies generating the open loop equilibrium
processes are not a Markov perfect equilibrium.
3.7 Collusive equilibria
The previous section tells us that there exists no Markov perfect equilibrium
in which the players have different investment boundaries whenever their
capital stocks differ. In these cases, the smaller firm necessarily invests my-
opically, but the larger firm has a strict incentive to preempt before the two
have equal capital stocks. Consequently, in any equilibrium, the players must
use the same investment boundary over part of the state space, also for some
heterogeneous capital levels. An example is of course the earlier obtained
Bertrand equilibrium with a shared price trigger.
On the other hand, it is clear from the equilibrium definition that at least
one of the firms must be indifferent to invest at the mutual boundary. We
can express this requirement in terms of the value function V .
So, suppose the players use the same reflection boundary X¯ over part of
the state space. At the respective own reflection boundary, V always has to
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satisfy the boundary condition (3.38), Vqi(X¯, q
i, q−i) = 1. Expanded, it is
equivalent to
Bqi = X¯
−β − β
β−1(p
∗)−1
(
α−1
α
qi + q−i
)(
qi + q−i)−
1
α
−1X¯1−β , Bp
qi
. (3.62)
We denote the right hand side by Bp
qi
, since this is the condition associated
with investment, resp. preemption.
The intended indifference condition is then
Vq−i(X¯, q
i, q−i) = 0, (3.63)
i.e. the value of the strategy is not affected if the opponent invests at the same
boundary. In the previous case, myopic investment, these two conditions only
held simultaneously for each player when both have equal capital stocks, cf.
(3.61). We can also expand the latter condition to
Bq−i =
1
β−1(p
∗)−1qi β
α
(
qi + q−i)−
1
α
−1X¯1−β , Btq−i . (3.64)
Similarly as before, Btq−i stands for tolerating investment.
Now, we can turn the approach taken so far around and try to identify
a reflection boundary X¯ that is consistent with (3.62) and (3.64) simultane-
ously.
Specifically, since Bqiq−i = Bq−iqi must hold, we obtain
10 a partial differ-
ential equation for X¯:
X¯−1p∗(qi + q−i)
1
α
+1X¯q−i −
(
α−1
α
qi + q−i
)
X¯q−i − 1αqiX¯qi = 0. (3.65)
If we require that both player be indifferent at the sought reflection boundary,
it is easy to see11 that the only solution of this PDE is the Bertrand price
trigger X¯(qi, q−i) = p∗(qi + q−i)
1
α .
However, it is sufficient for an equilibrium that only one player is indif-
ferent, say who has more capital installed. One can narrow down further
solutions of (3.65) by reflecting that a firm might only care about the ob-
served price in the investment decision, and that the price of indifference
10
∂qiB
t
q−i =
1
β−1 (p
∗)−1 βαX¯
−β(qi + q−i)− 1α−2((− 1αqi + q−i)X¯ − (β − 1)qi(qi + q−i)X¯qi)
∂q−iB
p
qi =− βX¯−β−1X¯q−i − ββ−1 (p∗)−1X¯−β
(
qi + q−i
)− 1α−2·
·
(
− 1α
(− 1αqi + q−i)X¯ − (β − 1)(α−1α qi + q−i)(qi + q−i)X¯q−i)
11Switch roles by swapping i,−i and take the difference of the two equations.
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depends only on the own installed capital. Correspondingly, we look for
solutions of the functional form
X¯(qi, q−i) = f(qi)(qi + q−i)
1
α . (3.66)
In this case, we calculate
X¯qi = (q
i + q−i)
1
α
−1((qi + q−i)f ′ + 1
α
f
)
and
X¯q−i = (q
i + q−i)
1
α
−1 1
α
f.
(3.65) now dramatically simplifies to
f + qif ′ = p∗,
the general solution of which is
f(qi) = p∗ + c · (qi)−1. (3.67)
Since investment below the Bertrand price cannot be optimal, we only admit
constants c ∈ [0,∞).
With all candidates other than the Bertrand equilibrium, i.e. whenever
c > 0, indeed only player i can be indifferent. The question which player to
make indifferent is easily answered, if we check whether (3.66) defines proper
reflection strategies. In fact, X¯q−i is nonnegative since f is, but X¯qi > 0 iff
(qi + q−i)f ′ + 1
α
f > 0
⇔ p∗(qi)2 − (α− 1)cqi − αcq−i > 0.
This only holds for a wide range of capital levels if qi ≥ q−i and is then
implied by
qi > c
2α− 1
p∗
. (3.68)
Consequently, if we define the symmetric investment boundary
X¯c(qi, q−i) ,
(
p∗ + c · (qi ∨ q−i)−1)(qi + q−i) 1α , (3.69)
it is a proper reflection boundary on
(
c2α−1
p∗ ,∞
)2
with X¯cqi > 0 and X¯
c
q−i > 0.
Furthermore, we can apply Theorem 3.4 to show that X¯c is a mutual best
reply.
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Proposition 3.9. Let X¯1 = X¯2 = X¯c given by (3.69) with fixed c ∈ R+, and
define φc(x, q−i) , sup{q ∈ R+|x ≥ X¯c(q, q−i)} ∨ 0. Further fix (x0, q10, q20) ∈
R+×
(
c2α−1
p∗ ,∞
)2
and set Qi =
(
qi0∨ sup0≤s≤t φc(Xs, q−i0 )
)
t≥0 and Q
−i ≡ q−i0 .
Define for any (x, q1, q2) ∈ R+ ×
(
c2α−1
p∗ ,∞
)2
V c(x, qi, q−i) ,
{
β
β−1q
i xP (q
i+q−i)
p∗ +B
c(qi, q−i)xβ if x ≤ X¯c(qi, q−i)
V c(x, φc(x, q−i), q−i)− φc(x, q−i) + qi else,
where
Bc(qi, q−i) , −
∫ ∞
qi
Bcqi(q, q
−i) dq, (3.70)
and
Bcqi(q
i, q−i) ,
(
1− β
β−1(p
∗)−1
(
α−1
α
qi+q−i
)(
qi+q−i
)− 1
α
−1
X¯c
)(
X¯c
)−β
. (3.71)
Then, V c(x0, q
i
0, q
−i
0 ) = J(Q
i, Q−i) = V ∗(x0, qi0, q
−i
0 ).
Proof. Since X¯1 = X¯2, it is easy to see that Qi, Q−i solve Problem 3.3 for
initial state (x0, q
1
0, q
2
0). It remains to show that V
c satisfies the hypothesis
and sufficient conditions of Theorem 3.4.
Note that Bc in (3.70) is well defined, since for fixed q−i, Bcqi goes to zero
at speed (qi)−
β
α when qi gets large. One can indeed show by repeating the
proof of Lemma 3.5 that V c also satisfies the boundedness condition, just
using different bounds for Bc and the reflection price:
xP (qi ∨ φc(x, q−i) + q−i)
p∗
≤ 2α
2α− 1
and
− β
β − 1
(P (qi + q−i)
p∗
)β
≤ Bcqi ≤
(P (qi + q−i)
p∗
)β
⇒
∣∣∣∣Bc(qi ∨ φc, q−i)xβ∣∣∣∣ ≤ αβ − α ββ − 1(qi ∨ φc + q−i)( 2α2α− 1)β.
Note finally that the process Q−i, which results from the Markovian strategy
φc given arbitrary Qi ∈ A (0), is dominated by the Bertrand quantity and
thus has finite investment cost.
All sufficient conditions are actually satisfied by construction, except for
the two sufficient conditions relating to the partial derivatives of V c. The
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easier one, V cqi ≤ 1 is equivalent to (3.41) as we have shown. Suppose wlog
q−i ≥ qi. Then,
p∗ + c(q−i)−1 ≤ p¯(qi, q−i)
is satisfied for all q−i ≥ qi iff qi ≥ c2α−1
p∗ , the restriction we already encoun-
tered. Note that p¯(qi, q−i) ≤ p¯(q−i, qi).
The other sufficient condition is Vq−i(X¯
c, qi, q−i) ≤ 0. It is equivalent to
Bcq−i ≤ Btq−i , cf. (3.64) using X¯c. For the player with larger capital stock, it
holds with equality by construction. Still supposing q−i ≥ qi, we can thus
also write for player i
Bcq−i(q
i, q−i) = Btq−i(q
−i, q−i)−
∫ q−i
qi
Bcqiq−i(q, q
−i) dq,
and compare to
Btq−i(q
i, q−i) = Btq−i(q
−i, q−i)−
∫ q−i
qi
Btq−iqi(q, q
−i) dq.
For concreteness,
Btq−i(q
i, q−i) = 1
β−1(p
∗)−1qi β
α
(
qi + q−i
)− β
α
−1(
p∗ + c(q−i)−1
)1−β
and
Bcqi(q
i, q−i) = 1
β−1(p
∗)−1
(
qi + q−i
)− β
α
−1(
p∗ + c(q−i)−1
)−β·
·
(
p∗(β − 1)(qi + q−i)− β(α−1
α
qi + q−i
)(
p∗ + c(q−i)−1
))
.
Then, a lengthy calculation yields that
Bcqiq−i ≥ Btq−iqi
⇔ q−i ≥ cα− 1
p∗
.
This is a weaker restriction than already imposed and thus Bcq−i ≤ Btq−i for
all q−i ≥ qi ≥ c2α−1
p∗ . Consequently, Vq−i(X¯
c, qi, q−i) ≤ 0. o.e.d.
In the proposition, we selected the processes Qi and Q−i by solving Prob-
lem 3.3 and determined the solution to the verification problems (3.6). The
outcome depends on which player is the leader, because there is full preemp-
tion. As the involved investment occurs at higher prices than Bertrand, the
78
payoffs to the players also differ. Nevertheless, (φc, φc) are a Markov perfect
equilibrium, because we can select feasible capital stock processes that are a
Pareto improvement compared to full preemption as in the proposition. We
exploit the indifference of the respective larger firm.
Theorem 3.10. For any c ∈ R+, (φc, φc) as defined in Proposition 3.9 is a
Markov perfect equilibrium for initial capital levels (q10, q
2
0) ∈
(
c2α−1
p∗ ,∞
)2
.
Proof. Introduce the symmetric capital levels which are just on the invest-
ment boundary by
Qs(x) , sup{q ∈ R+|x ≥ X¯c(q, q)} ∨ 0, (3.72)
which is well defined for x ∈ R+ because
∂qX¯
c(q, q) = 2
1
α q
1
α
−1
(
1
α
p∗ − α−1
α
cq−1
)
(3.73)
is strictly positive for all q > cα−1
p∗ .
Qs will generate the capital processes where the firms grow jointly in
equilibrium. We have to show that this is not to the disadvantage of any
firm.
Begin with an initial state in the forbidden region, i.e. x0 > X¯
c(qi, q−i),
which requires a jump.
On {x > X¯c(qi, q−i)}, player i jumps when being the leader and by our
definition,
V c(x, qi, q−i) = V c(x, φc(x, q−i), q−i)− φc(x, q−i) + qi.
Consequently, in this region, V cqi = 1 and
V cq−i(x, q
i, q−i) = V cq−i(x, φ
c(x, q−i), q−i)
= 0 if φc(x, q−i) ≥ q−i, (3.74)
where the latter holds by construction, cf. (3.63).
Now we dictate a different investment for player i in two parts of the
forbidden region.
If, on the one hand, {X¯c(qi, q−i) < x ≤ X¯c(qi, qi)}, this is equivalent to
Qs(x) ≤ qi < φc(x, q−i).
The monotonicity of X¯c then implies qi ≥ φc(x, qi). Further, by symmetry
of X¯c, we always have
qi = φc(x, φc(x, qi)).
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So, for all q ∈ [q−i, φc(x, qi)], (3.74) holds, including the second line. It
follows
V c(x, qi, q−i) = V c(x, qi, φc(x, qi)),
i.e. player i is indifferent if we let −i jump to bring the state onto the bound-
ary of the forbidden region.
If, on the other hand, {x ≥ X¯c(qi, qi) ∨ X¯c(q−i, q−i)}, this is equivalent
to qi ∨ q−i ≤ Qs(x).
This time, the monotonicity of X¯c implies that for all q−i ≤ Qs(x),
φc(x, q−i) ≥ q−i. We apply the second line of (3.74) once more to obtain
V c(x, qi, q−i) = V c(x, qi, Qs(x)) = V c(x,Qs(x), Qs(x))−Qs(x) + qi
in this region. Thus, player i is indifferent if we allow both to jump to Qs(x).
Now consider reflection investment at the boundary. Then, by definition,
V cqi(X¯
c, qi, q−i) = 1. We also constructed X¯c such that a player is indiffer-
ent to invest at the boundary if the opponent does not have strictly more
capital installed, i.e. if qi ≥ q−i, V cq−i(X¯c, qi, q−i) = 0. Consequently, we
can choose capital processes such that only the smaller firm invests, or both
invest simultaneously.
Such processes are indeed feasible.
Select Qc,i ∈ A (qi0) that satisfies for all t ∈ [0,∞) P-a.s.,
Qc,it = q
i
0 ∨
(
1{qi0∨ sup0≤s≤t φc(Xs,q−i0 )<q−i0 } sup0≤s≤tφ
c(Xs, q
−i
0 )
+1{qi0∨ sup0≤s≤t φc(Xs,q−i0 )≥ q−i0 } sup0≤s≤tQ
s(Xs)
)
.
The larger firm starts tracking Qs(Xt) from the beginning and the smaller
firm, i.e. with qi0 < q
−i
0 , switches when
φc(Xs, q
−i
0 ) ≥ q−i0 ⇔ Xs ≥ X¯c(q−i0 , q−i0 )
⇔ Qs(Xs) ≥ q−i0 .
This also implies that the processes solve (3.7):
Qc,it = q
i
0 ∨ sup
0≤s≤t
φc(Xs, Q
c,−i
s ).
Now we can perform the estimation in the proof of Theorem 3.4 with
equality holding, to find that
V c(x0, q
i
0, q
−i
0 ) = J(Q
c,i, Qc,−i) = J(Qi, Q−i).
o.e.d.
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Theorem 3.10 answers the “open question” (K. Back, [4]) whether there
exist any other subgame perfect equilibria of the game with reflection strate-
gies besides the Bertrand equilibrium.
Our additional class of equilibria is driven by the fact that preemptive in-
vestment of the larger firm lowers the price at which the smaller firm invests.
The smaller firm does not face this externality and it also has the greater
local investment incentive, based on marginal revenue. Thus, it is able to
set a dynamic investment price boundary above Bertrand which leaves the
opponent indifferent. Note that the investment price boundary has to de-
cline gradually in equilibrium, since we saw in Section 3.5 that preemption
is otherwise the dominant strategy.
With the present example we falsified the frequent conjecture that pre-
emption concerns completely eliminate option values under arbitrarily divisi-
ble investment. The friction implied by uncertain returns and the decreasing
marginal revenue effect do enable more collusive outcomes with quantities
less than those enforcing the Bertrand price. We consequently opt for calling
these collusive equilibria.
3.8 Conclusion
In this work we focused on the strategic effect of capital commitment with
arbitrarily divisible, irreversible investment under dynamic uncertainty. We
established frameworks for games with two crucially different classes of strate-
gies, open loop vs. closed loop.
When there is no explicit feedback between the opponents’ investment
decisions, each player chooses an optimal capital stock process by solving a
stochastic control problem of the monotone follower type. Our presentation
is — owing to its generality — unambiguous in the sense that we operate with
the capital processes directly without resorting to trigger functions. By this
approach we can isolate the individual investment incentives in the interre-
lated optimization problems. Specifically, investment always occurs following
an opportunity-cost-of-delay principle, which results from the classical real
option effect. The value of the option to delay investment is reduced by com-
petition because of the standard Cournot effect of diminishing investment
externalities on own capital.
Consequently, similar existence conditions for equilibrium arise as in a
one-shot Cournot game, independent of the underlying uncertainty model.
The prevailing class of equilibria is that in which capital stocks are ultimately
equalized by investment of the currently smallest firms only. For an arbitrary
number of players with heterogeneous initial capital levels, these equilibria
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can be determined by solving a single monotone follower problem. At each
state there is a well defined capital level which is the myopic best reply to
the current capital stocks of the opponents, and all firms invest up to this
“base capacity” if it exceeds their respective stock. We conclude that without
explicit feedback, the option to delay investment is generally too valuable to
admit preemptive investment.
As a natural conjecture, the opposite is true when closed loop strategies
are modelled and one considers subgame perfect equilibria. In order to be
able to verify formally whether ideal circumstances for preemption necessar-
ily eliminate all option values, we propose a framework for the game between
two players with closed loop strategies, too. Using a state space representa-
tion, we enable the players to make investment decisions by choosing desired
capital levels, which are relevant only when exceeding installed capital.
This approach is inspired by the signal processes prevailing in the earlier
monotone follower problems and allows to avoid artificial bounds on the speed
of capital adjustment — so singular control is admissible —, while ensuring
consistency across subgames. Since one encounters the typical difficulty of
continuous-time games, that a priori natural strategies do not uniquely de-
termine the course of the state, particular attention has to be paid to an
appropriate equilibrium concept. We introduce a strong optimality notion
by requiring that there exists a solution in capital processes, such that no
player has an incentive to choose any other control process at any state, even
if unilateral perfect preemption is made feasible by hypothesis.
Our equilibrium definition is complemented by establishing a verification
theorem. It serves to solve the optimal control problems arising in equilibrium
verification in the presence of Markovian strategies and geometric Brownian
motion as exogenous shock process. We subsequently apply the theorem to
the example in which firms face an inverse demand with constant elasticity,
in order to derive Markov perfect equilibria.
The simplest instance is the arguably expected equilibrium, showing per-
fectly competitive investment. It results when firms use a constant price to
trigger investment. Then, implied by stationarity, the decision whether to
preempt at the threshold is always the same. By repeated investment op-
portunities and rent equalization, firms are always indifferent when investing
and make zero expected profits.
The observation that firms invest (or threaten to) at an identical threshold
is an important aspect of any equilibrium. Whenever the thresholds differ,
we can show that one firm necessarily invests myopically to behave optimally.
Then, it can only be optimal for the opponent to refrain from preemption
when having sufficiently more capital already installed. On the other hand,
when having too much capital, preemption is definitely unprofitable.
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Consequently, there is potential for equilibria without full preemption.
While those Markovian strategies generating the open loop equilibrium pro-
cesses for any starting state are not eligible, we identify a particular class of
Markov perfect equilibria with positive option values.
As the crucial component, a dynamic output good price to trigger in-
vestment allows for collusive behaviour. The respective larger firm is kept
indifferent in these equilibria when the opponent invests. By refraining from
preemption, the larger firm allows both players to obtain the highest possible
returns, given the equilibrium Markovian strategies, since any investment by
the larger firm reduces the (common) investment boundary. Neither player
has an incentive to deviate from the Pareto optimal solution in capital pro-
cesses. When they have equal capital stocks, simultaneous investment occurs.
We observe collusion similar to the simultaneous investment equilibria in the
real option exercise games discussed in the introduction.
As a future research question, it would be interesting to enquire in detail
the relation of the identified equilibria to those with larger investment sizes.
But there are more general topics to address, since we proposed the first
framework for games with singular control and feedback strategies in the
literature. Besides broadening the present analysis, possibly to different ap-
plications, a fundamental question is for instance whether our equilibria can
be represented as limits of discrete time games with frequent actions, in order
to establish a more solid foundation in (classical) game theory.
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Appendix
Lemma 3.11. Let (qi, q−i) ∈ R2+ and X¯−i ≥ p∗/P (qi+ q−i) satisfying (3.12)
be given. Suppose Qi ∈ A (qi) and Q−i = q−i ∨ (sup0≤s≤t φ−i(Xs, Qis))t≥0 ∈
A (q−i).
Define the cumulative Bertrand quantity
QB , qi ∨
(
sup
0≤s≤t
(
Xs/p
∗)α − q−i)
t≥0
,
as well as the capped capital process
Qˆi , Qi ∧QB
and the resulting
Qˆ−i , q−i ∨ ( sup
0≤s≤t
φ−i(Xs, Qˆis)
)
t≥0.
Then,
J(Qi, Q−i)− J(Qˆi, Qˆ−i) ≤ 0.
Proof. Define the stopping times
τB , inf{t ≥ 0|Qit > QBt } and τˆB , inf{t ≥ τB|QBt ≥ Qit}
and note that Q−it = Qˆ
−i
t = Q
−i
τB
for t ∈ [τB, τˆB].
This allows to use Fubini’s theorem as in Chapter 2 to obtain
E
[∫ τˆB
τB
e−rtΠ(Xt, Qit, Q
−i
t ) dt−
∫ τˆB
τB
e−rt dQit
]
−E
[∫ τˆB
τB
e−rtΠ(Xt, QBt , Qˆ
−i
t ) dt−
∫ τˆB
τB
e−rt dQBt
]
=
∫ ∞
0
E
[
1{Qi
τB
≤l≤Qi
τˆB
}
∫ τQB (l)
τQi (l)
e−rt
(
Πqi(Xt, l, Q
−i
τB
)− r) dt] dl,
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where τQ
i
(l) , inf{t ≥ 0|Qit ≥ l} and τQB(l) analogously.
Now note that in the random interval
[
τQ
i
(l), τQ
B
(l)
]
,
Πqi(Xt, l, Q
−i
τB
) ≤ XtP (l +Q−iτB) ≤ p∗Xt,
so that for any l, stopping at τQ
i
(l) immediately is optimal for maximizing
the expectation with respect to stopping times τ ≥ τQi(l). Consequently, for
any l, the expectation is nonpositive and this implies the same for the payoff
difference over [τB, τˆB]. o.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 3.5
We want to prove that
lim
T→∞
E
[
e−rTV (XT , QiT , q
−i)
]
= 0
for arbitrary Qi ∈ A (0) with finite cost.
The value function candidate is given by
V (x, qi, q−i) =
{
β
β−1q
i xP (q
i+q−i)
p∗ +B(q
i, q−i)xβ if qi ≥ φi(x, q−i)
V (x, φi, q−i)− φi + qi else.
We hide the arguments of φi in the following.
First, we derive joint bounds for all terms but Bxβ. Since the reflection
price is not less than the Bertrand price,
xP (φi + q−i) ≥ p∗
⇒ β
β − 1φ
ixP (φ
i + q−i)
p∗
− φi ≥ 0.
For an upper bound, note that the price term is in both cases bounded by a
constant:
xP (qi ∨ φi + q−i)
p∗
≤ p
−i
p∗
. (3.75)
Thus, we can estimate both cases of V simultaneously by
V (x, qi, q−i) ∈ (0, β
β − 1
p−i
p∗
(
qi ∨ φi))+B(qi ∨ φi, q−i)xβ (3.76)
The remaining term can also be estimated by using the price bound (3.75).
In the present case:∣∣Bp−i(qi ∨ φi, q−i)xβ∣∣ ≤ α
β − α
∣∣∣∣(qi ∨ φi)(p−i(α− 1)(r − µ)α − 1
)
+ q−i
(
p−i
p∗
− 1
)∣∣∣∣
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Thus, V is bounded by a linear function of qi ∨ φi.
Since φi never pushes the price below the Bertrand price, the Bertrand
quantity (particularly neglecting competitive output) is an upper bound for
it:
xP (φi + q−i) ≥ p∗ ⇒ φi ≤
( x
p∗
)α
− q−i ≤
( x
p∗
)α
.
This proves the first claim, since limT→∞E
[
e−rTXαT
]
= 0 for α < β and
limT→∞E
[
e−rTQiT
]
= 0 by hypothesis.
For the second claim, note that the capital process resulting from the
Bertrand reflection strategy X¯ i = p∗/P (qi + q−i) is Qit = q
i
0 ∨ (X∗t /p∗)α− q−i0
with X∗t , sup0≤s≤tXs. Consequently, the investment cost is bounded if the
following holds
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(X∗t )
α dt
]
=
β
β − α ∈ R+ ⇔ α < β, (3.77)
cf. [31]; the left hand side equals
E
[
(X∗τ(r))
α
]
=
ΨαY (r)
ΨαY (r)− 1 ,
where τ(r) is an independent, exponentially distributed time, and ΨαY (r) is
the Laplace exponent of the process αY at r. In our case, Xαt = x
α
0 e
αYt , i.e.
Yt = (µ− 12σ2)t+ σBt ⇒ ΨαY (r) = βα .
Proof of Theorem 2.15
Let l′, l ∈ R+, with l′ > l and qk−1 ≤ l ≤ qk, qk′−1 ≤ l′ ≤ qk′ . Then,
pi(t, l′,
∑
j>1
qj ∨ l′)− pi(t, l,
∑
j>1
qj ∨ l)
= pi(t, l′, (k′ − 1)l′ +
∑
j≥k′
qj)− pi(t, l, (k − 1)l +
∑
j≥k
qj)
= pi(t, l′, (k′ − 1)l′ +
∑
j≥k′
qj)− pi(t, qk′−1, (k′ − 1)qk′−1 +
∑
j≥k′
qj)
+ pi(t, qk
′−1, (k′ − 2)qk′−1 +
∑
j≥k′−1
qj)− pi(t, qk′−2, (k′ − 2)qk′−2 +
∑
j≥k′−1
qj)
...
+ pi(t, qk, (k − 1)qk +
∑
j≥k
qj)− pi(t, l, (k − 1)l +
∑
j≥k
qj) =
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=∫ l′
qk′−1
[
Πqiqi(t, y, (k
′ − 1)y +
∑
j≥k′
qj) + (k′ − 1)Πqiq−i(t, y, (k′ − 1)y +
∑
j≥k′
qj)
]
dy
+
...
+
∫ qk
l
[
Πqiqi(t, y, (k − 1)y +
∑
j≥k
qj) + (k − 1)Πqiq−i(t, y, (k − 1)y +
∑
j≥k
qj)
]
dy
< 0
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